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Justifying Restorative Justice: A
Theoretical Justification for the Use of
Restorative Justice Practices
Zvi D. Gabbay*
It is no secret that the criminal justice system, society's means for responding
to crime, is far from perfect. Crime victims often feel neglected and ignored by
prosecutors and judges, the public does not perceive the system as just and fair,
and the system's effectiveness in combating crime is questionable. Despite this
reality, an alternative process has emerged, based on a new and entirely different
paradigm of justice-the restorative justice paradigm. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that restorative processes, which empower crime victims, offenders and
communities to take an active part in the formulation of the public response to
crime, increase public trust in the justice system and may even reduce re-offense
rates. However, questions still remain as to whether employing such processes
within the realm of criminal law can be justified and whether these processes con-
flict with governing theories of punishment.
This paper analyzes the premises of the two main theories of punishment that
influence sentencing policies in most Western countries-retributivism and utili-
tarianism-and compares them to the basic values that structure the restorative
justice theory. It then makes clear distinctions between restorative justice and the
rehabilitative ideal and addresses the criticism that, like rehabilitation, restorative
justice results in different punishments to equally culpable offenders. The paper
concludes that restorative justice does not contradict retribution and utility as
theoretical justifications for penal sanctioning. Moreover, it suggests that restora-
tive practices rehabilitate the basic notions of retribution and deterrence that have
been neglected in modern sentencing schemes, that restorativism contributes new
and deeper meaning to those notions and values, and that in doing so restorative
justice practices improve and promote society's response to crime.
I. PREAMBLE
It was a dry winter evening in January 2000. R., a young fighter pilot in the
Israeli Air Force, was driving his car way home to one of the suburbs of Tel Aviv.
Despite rush hour, traffic was moving smoothly, and R. was in no hurry. Sud-
denly the brake lights of the car in front of him came on and the car quickly came
to a full stop. R. hit the brakes and tried to steer the car aside to avoid colliding
with the car in front of him. He was unable to stop and the passenger sitting in the
* The writer is a former prosecutor for the Tel Aviv District Attorney's Office (Criminal Division)
and is currently a doctorate (JSD) candidate at Columbia University School of Law. I am very grateful
for the comments and contributions of John Braithwaite, George Fletcher, James Liebman, Jeffrey
Fagan, Carol Liebman, and Robert Ferguson. I would also like to thank my mother, Shoshana, who
tirelessly read through drafts of this article and my wife, Dafna, for her wisdom and encouragement.
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back seat of the car in front of him was killed instantly. The deceased was a
mother on the way to her son's wedding. The driver of the car was her daughter.
The police investigation determined that the car driving in front of R. slowed
down and stopped due to heavy traffic and that the situation involved no unusual
circumstances. If R. had paid more attention to the road ahead of him, he would
have likely noticed the traffic delay and taken the necessary measures to avoid the
accident. His negligence resulted in a fatal car crash.
The evidence of his negligence precluded any course of action other than to
charge R. with negligent homicide, an offense for which the maximum punish-
ment is three years imprisonment. In the arraignment hearing, R. entered a "not
guilty" plea, which launched a long and intense trial. After nearly two years, R.
was convicted as charged, but due to his impeccable record, his duties and contri-
bution to society, and the circumstances of the accident, he was sentenced to six
months of community service in an old age home and precluded from holding a
driver's license for a few years. For the prosecutor, defense attorney and judge
who tried the case, there was nothing special about it. It was one of many fatal car
accident cases which they were accustomed to handling. The outcome of the trial
was determined by professionals, dealing with complex questions of substantive
criminal law, evidentiary rules and procedure.1 The final sentence-well within
the common range of sentencing for these types of cases-was anticipated from
the start.
Ironically, even though the trial was controlled entirely by professionals, it
was certainly not about them. It was the bereaved family, the deceased's friends
and neighbors, R., and his family and close friends that were affected by the fatal
accident. It was their lives that changed after the accident. Therefore, the ques-
tion should be: 'How did the trial affect them?' The short answer is "not well."
At the end of the trial, the bereaved family was devastated. They did not under-
stand why the trial took so long and could not accept its outcome. They were
personally hurt by the fact the young pilot did not assume responsibility immedi-
ately and lost all respect for the justice system that accepted this behavior. After
close to two years of legal proceedings, the bereaved family and friends felt vic-
timized again, this time by the justice system. Interestingly, R.'s reaction to his
trial was probably not very different. As he clearly articulated in his confident
testimony in court, he truly did not feel responsible for the accident. It is unlikely
that he changed his mind after the conviction and probably perceived his convic-
tion to be unjust.
Although the facts of this case occurred in Israel and were tried according to
Israeli law, it is representative of the methods employed by most common law
criminal justice systems as their primary response to crime. However, this method
suffers from three basic deficiencies, illustrated in this case: (1) the lack of a
meaningful role for crime victims, (2) inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and (3)
inability to be perceived as just and fair. After two years of legal proceedings, the
decedent's family was victimized again by the justice system, the offender did not
I. See Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Reconstructing Professional Roles in Restorative Justice
Programs, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 57 (examining the roles of professionals in the criminal justice system:




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss2/4
Justifying Restorative Justice
learn anything he did not already know before the trial began, and both sides felt
they were treated unjustly.
In this article, I will first discuss these three deficiencies in detail, introduce
the restorative justice paradigm, offer a working definition for restorative prac-
tices and demonstrate their ability to successfully address the criminal justice
system's deficiencies. Next, I will analyze the theoretical justification for using
such practices in light of the retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment,
since it is not self-evident that the law should grant any standing to a process de-
signed to confront victims and offenders and encourage them to agree on ways of
restoring the harm caused by the offense. I will argue that the law should do so
and will show that not only is restorative justice theoretically compatible with
both retributivism and utilitarianism, but it can rehabilitate, enrich and improve
the fundamental premises of these punishment theories. At the same time, I will
illustrate the differences between restorative justice and the rehabilitative ideal,
which are often confused as variations on the same theme.
II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
A. What is wrong with our criminal justice system?
1. The place of crime victims in the criminal justice system
The case of R. illustrates a number of problems that are not sufficiently ad-
dressed by the current criminal justice system operating in most, if not all, of the
western world. First, it demonstrates the way in which the justice system deals-
or does not deal-with the victims of criminal offenses; in this case, the dece-
dent's family. Their formal participation in the process was restricted to the tes-
timony of the daughter, who drove the family car. In theory, that could have been
a healing opportunity for her to tell her story and face the person accused of caus-
ing her mother's death. Not surprisingly, this was not how her experience in court
turned out. During cross-examination, she was accused of lying and blaming the
defendant in order to ease her guilty conscience. She had to sit silently while the
defense presented the court with expert opinions by psychologists and psychia-
trists diagnosing her as suffering from post-traumatic repression and as casting
blame on another to save herself. She (as well as the other family members, for
that matter) did not have any control over the trial or its outcome because crime
victims and their families, in general, have no legal status in criminal proceedings.
If the daughter had not been a relevant witness to the accident, she would not have
been called to testify, hence leaving her and her family completely out of the legal
process.
Typically, prosecutors do not consult with crime victims on appropriate ways
of dealing with cases that concern them and, in most cases, pay very little atten-
tion to the victim's point of view in the course of plea-bargaining. 2 There are
2. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS
190-93 (Addison-Wesley 1995) (hereinafter WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME) (providing an example of a
Brooklyn District Attorney who ignored the opinion of the parents of a kidnapped child in agreeing to
2005]
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always exceptions, but normally, the prosecution will make the final decision.
Disregard of the victim's interests, however, cannot be attributed solely to the
practice of prosecutors. Even if the prosecution does its best to inform victims of
developments in the proceedings, to listen to them and to treat them with the ut-
most respect and compassion, there still remains an inherent disregard of crime
victims that stems from the basic theory of criminal law.3 Criminal offenses are
defined according to the acts of the offenders and their state of mind during those
actions. A criminal trial is focused on proving the legal components of the spe-
cific violated norm. If these legal components are proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, the discussion moves to the appropriate sanctions or treatment that is to be
imposed on the defendant. The entire focus is on the offender. The protected
interests behind the offenses are those of the commonwealth, the people or the
state, rather than those of the particular victim.
Assuming we believe victim's interests should be addressed, at least to some
extent, by the criminal justice system as part of the appropriate public response to
crime,4 it must be concluded that the existing justice system suffers a serious defi-
ciency. This salient deficiency gave rise to many victim advocacy groups, to the
creation of various victim's rights, and in numerous jurisdictions, even to legisla-
tive reforms providing certain acknowledgments of these rights. 5 However, while
these changes may have improved the way crime victims are treated by the judi-
cial system to some extent, none have attempted to amend the core deficiency.
Victims still remain a foreign factor in the definition of a criminal offense and the
substantive and procedural laws governing criminal proceedings. The question
then is how should the justice system integrate crime victims' interests into the
system? Since our justice system is based on the premise of finite rights that must
be distributed, we are forced to decide when to prefer one legitimate right over
a plea-bargain with the defendant. Fletcher concludes this example by arguing that crime victims
should be given the power to approve or disapprove any plea bargain).
3. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BuFF. CRIM. L.
REv. 51 (1999) (attempting to reconcile the legitimate interests of crime victims with the absence of
any legal standing they might be expected to have in punishment theories).
4. It may be argued that the existing situation is correct, and that victim interests are a matter for
civil suit. There certainly is merit in the common approach that crime is an offense against society,
and not only against the victim. Therefore, the response should address the general harm done by the
offense, not merely the one caused to the victim. However, as Fletcher suggests in WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME, supra note 2, there is still room for improvement even within the current commonlaw criminal
justice system (see especially Chapter Six-"Victims at the Center"-for concrete suggestions as to
how crime victims can be given a say within the criminal proceedings).
5. See Helen Reeves & Kate Mulley, The New Status of Victims in the UK: Opportunities and
Threats, in INTEGRATING A VICTIM PERSPECTIVE WITHIN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 125 (Adam Crawford ed.
UK, 2000) (discussing recent reforms in crime victims' status in the UK); the Israeli Crime Victims'
Rights Act, 2001 (an unprecedented Act in the Israeli legal system that provides enumerated rights for
crime victims in the different stages of the criminal process, from the police investigation to the time
the offender is about to be released from prison. Unfortunately, due to budget problems, most of the
Act's provisions were stayed until funds are allocated). In the United States, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, rule 32(i)(B), provides that a federal court "must address any crime of violence or
sexual abuse at sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any information about the
sentence." FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(6) (2004). Although this statute recognized the victim's right to be
heard before sentencing, this right's scope is very limited. Id. First, it only applies to victims of vio-
lent or sexual crimes; second, it does not impose any duty on the judge to consider the victims' posi-
tion before sentencing the defendant. Id. The statute provides certain victims with the opportunity to
speak. Id. It does not determine who has to listen. Id.
[Vol. 2
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others. When it comes to the criminal justice system, what is the correct balance
between the need to address the public aspect of the crime and the legitimate
needs of the particular victim? As will be seen, answering these concerns and
questions are among the primary objectives of the restorative justice theory, and
integrating the victim's perspective in the public response to crime is at the heart
of restorative practices.
2. Efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system
What is the ultimate goal of the criminal justice system? One approach is that
it should do justice, as its name indicates. What this entails is a complex question
which cannot be appropriately developed within the scope of this article. How-
ever, a utilitarian approach to the criminal justice system may attribute to it the
goal of crime control.6 While the criminal justice system is undoubtedly effective
in reducing crime rates to some extent, it often achieves this goal inefficiently and
at a significant fiscal expense. After more than 20 years of being "tough on
crime," incorporating harsh sentencing guidelines, long prison terms and manda-
tory minimum punishments, the United States has reached the point where it may
not be able to go any further in carrying out these policies. With more than 2.2
million people incarcerated in federal, state and local facilities, 7 the highest rate of
imprisonment per population in the world,s and estimated expenses that may ex-
ceed $30,000 per year per inmate, 9 policy-makers from both sides of the political
spectrum, as well as practitioners, are forced to reexamine this huge monetary
investment. One of the results of these new alliances can be found in new nation-
wide legislation that is aimed at keeping certain categories of offenders out of the
prison system.'0 While this legislation is part of the solution, its existence sup-
6. This issue will be further developed later in the article through the comparison of utilitarianism
and restorative justice.
7. According to a press release published by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics on July 27, 2003, the country's prisons, jails and juvenile facilities held 2,166,260 persons at
the end of 2002, an increase in prison population of 2.6% (15,713 persons) compared to the previous
year. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Press Release, U.S. Prison Population Rises 2.6 Percent During
2002 (July 27, 2003) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/p02pr.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2005).
8. Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States,
2003 UTAH L. REv. 413, 415 n.10 (quoting the estimated imprisonment rate as 699 per 100,000 popu-
lation). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin for 2003, the incarceration rate has
increased to an estimated 714 per 100,000. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Press Release, U.S. Prison
Population Rises 2.6 Percent During 2002 (July 27, 2003) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov
/bjs/pub/pressp02pr.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). One in every 109 men were sentenced prisoners
under the jurisdiction of State or Federal authorities at year-end 2003 State prisons are at 16% above
capacity and Federal prisons are operating at 39% above capacity. Id.
9. Darren Bush, Law and Economics of Restorative Justice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and
Should Not Be Solely About Restoration 2003 UTAH LAW REVIEW 439, at 456 (citing ROBERT COOTER
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 46, 468 (3d ed. 2000)); Drake Bennett & Robert Kuttner,
Crime and Redemption, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, December 2003, at 2; Matthew Yglesias, The
Research Wars, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, December 2003, at 2 (quoting a slightly different estimate
of approximately $20,000-$25,000 per year per inmate).
10. See Bennett & Kuttner, supra note 9, at I (Texas has recently passed a bill mandating that first-
time low-level drug offenders get treatment instead of prison time; Michigan passed three bills repeal-
ing the state's mandatory minimum drug laws; Colorado gave judges the discretion to put drug offend-
ers on probation instead of prison sentences; Missouri and Delaware have reduced sentences for drug
2005]
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ports the contention that the current criminal justice system is facing a serious
problem that needs to be addressed. This deficiency was well-articulated by Dar-
ren Bush:
Given the decline in the value of additional years of imprisonment, it is
questionable whether lengthy sentences will resolve the issue. The bene-
fits of long-term incarceration will be outweighed by the costs under any
analysis, given that it serves no deterrence purpose, increases societal
costs, and leaves offenders who might otherwise be productive members
of society without that ability."'
An additional concern is the effectiveness of the justice system's response to
crime and its success in preventing it. Admittedly, studies show the United States
is experiencing a substantial decline in crime rates, in both violent and property
offenses.' 2 In part, this has to do with the massive incarceration rates and their
deterrent effect.13 However, there is a general belief among scholars that the re-
duction in crime is the result of other social forces independent of the punitive
legislation of the past two decades, such as improvement in the economy, changes
in substance abuse patterns and, some even suggest, the declining rates of mar-
riage.' 4 In other words, while prison and deterrence work to some extent, it is
clear they do not work very well, and definitely not well enough.' 5 To Howard
Zehr, one of the forefathers of the restorative justice movement, the reasons for
the ineffectiveness of prison come as no surprise. In Changing Lenses, 16 Zehr
described a case in which the judge, while sentencing a young offender to 20 to 85
years in prison, told the offender, "I trust that [in prison] you will forget the pat-
terns of behavior which led to this violent offense."' 17 True, it was a violent crime,
but can we seriously hope the prison experience will teach this teenage offender
normative patterns of behavior? As Zehr mentions, prison life teaches inmates the
exact opposite. It teaches them to be obedient, but does not give them the tools to
become self-governing and to take charge of their life in legitimate ways. It
teaches them the virtues of manipulation and violence as means for problem solv-
ing and deprives them of the ability to cope peacefully with frustration and con-
flict. It is structured to dehumanize the inmates, denying them a sense of self-
worth and self-respect and, in turn, the ability to respect others.'
8
While one might disagree with Zehr on different aspects of the incarceration
experience, few people would argue that prison is an educational institution that
prepares its inmates for the normative life they will be expected to live outside its
walls. Since prison is, in many cases, perceived as the only appropriate punish-
offenses and low-level felonies; Arizona, Washington and Indiana reduced drug-offender sentences
and are channeling their savings into treatment programs).
11. Bush, supra note 9, at 457.
12. See Beale, supra note 8, at 422.
13. As Professor Franklin Zimring of Berkeley University Law School stated: "It would be aston-
ishing if locking up 2 million people had zero effect on the crime rate." Yglesias, supra note 9, at 1.
14. See Beale, supra note 8, at 424; Yglesias, supra note 9, at 3.
15. See Yglesias, supra note 9, at 2.
16. HowARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE (1990).
17. Id. at 18.
18. Id. at 35-40.
[Vol. 2
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ment for almost every type of crime, and since we do not send every convicted
offender to life imprisonment without parole, it is surprising how little energy is
invested in preparations for "the day after," the time in which the incarcerated
offender will reenter society. There is an abundance of legislation, media cover-
age and political attention focused on the question of who gets locked up and for
how long, but a lot less attention is given to the question of what happens once the
sentence is over. What follows is a high rate of recidivism and re-arrest,' 9 which
raises serious questions regarding the effectiveness of the justice system currently
employed by the vast majority of countries around the world. Moreover, in some
cases re-offense might even occur for the mere purpose of reentering the only
world the offender knows-prison. As will be shown, the restorative justice
theory focuses on designing a public response to crime that is open to stakeholder
participation, offering a meaningful response to those most affected by the crime.
While this aspect of restorative justice clearly emphasizes justice (or more accu-
rately procedural justice 21) as the center of the criminal justice system, it still re-
mains to be asked whether restorative justice can achieve utilitarian goals, such as
the reduction of recidivism and enhancement of public safety. As will be shown
later in this part, the answer to these questions is that restorative justice at least
will not do worse, and may even do better, than the current criminal justice system
regarding crime control.
3. "Justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice ,22
One of the main concerns of the justice system is to provide the public with a
"fair procedure" through which the questions of substantive law will be deter-
mined. In criminal law, this concern gave rise to a complex and well developed
constitutional right to "due process." Numerous statutes and court decisions pro-
vide criminal defendants with a detailed procedure intended to protect them from
abuse of governmental power and false accusations. The presumption of inno-
cence, the unique burden of proof imposed on the criminal accuser, rules of evi-
dence discovery-all are examples of rules designed to ensure the fairness of the
process. However, the justice system is most concerned with another aspect of
"fairness," and that is the way it is perceived by the public. In many instances,
,23judges cite the famous quote: "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.
Moreover, judges often emphasize that "it is not merely of some importance but is
of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should mani-
19. According to a study published by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, of
nearly 300,000 released prisoners from 15 different states during 1994, 67.5% were rearrested within 3
years. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 (June 2002) available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf) (last visited Dec. I, 2005) [hereinafter Bureau of
Justice Statistics]. A study of 1983 releases estimated 62.5% were rearrested. Id.
20. See ZEHR, supra note 16, at 39.
21. See Tom R. Tyler & Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
LAW 65 (Joseph Sanders and Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (explaining the concept of "procedural justice"
and providing empirical evidence in support of this approach to the concept of justice).
22. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
23. Id. See also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 189 (2002); Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S.
765, 817 (2002); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994).
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festly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. 24 Returning to the story of R., the
negligent driver, it is clear that none of the people most affected by the tragic ac-
cident felt that the criminal proceedings that followed the accident contributed to a
just result. In this case, one may wonder if justice had indeed been done since
none of the participants perceived it as so. It is not clear that a legal process can
be considered fair simply because the professionals controlling it performed their
duties in accordance with the law. If the appearance of justice is indeed so "fun-
damentally important" to the fairness of the process, the absence of such an ap-
pearance should implicate a serious question as to the viability and legitimacy of
the process, and should encourage the search for an alternative that may be per-
ceived as more just.
One of the main problems with searching for this kind of alternative is the
vagueness of the terms "justice" and "fairness." Do we really know what "jus-
tice" is? Is it enough to recognize a "fair" process when we see one without ab-
stractly defining it in advance? There is no consensus on the answer to these
questions, and many different paradigms have been offered for better understand-
ing the meaning of these terms. Nevertheless, it seems that one of the identifiable
problems regarding the appearance of justice in the justice system is that it is con-
trolled solely by professionals. 25 It is these professionals who determine what is
considered to be a just outcome, according to predetermined rules. Therefore, it is
not surprising to find that occasionally, the non-professional participants in the
process, the ones most affected by the events leading to these proceedings, experi-
ence the outcome in legal proceedings in an entirely different way. Since they
have no control over the process, there is a substantial chance they will feel the
process mistreated them or failed to achieve an outcome important to them.
But is it true that the current justice system is not perceived as just and fair?
Apparently, it seems to satisfy the appearance of justice to some extent. The ques-
tion is whether that extent is satisfactory. We might be facing the same situation
we faced when examining the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice
system-it works, but not well enough. Similarly, the system is generally per-
ceived positively, but if we assume the appearance of justice is indeed a "funda-
mentally important" component of justice, we may want to improve that appear-
ance. Empirical studies support this conclusion. When asked to describe the de-
gree of fairness or unfairness with which the criminal justice system treats people
accused of committing a crime, 32% of the respondents in a national survey an-
swered that the system was unfair. The great majority of respondents in the same
survey were willing to concede that the system was "somewhat fair," but only a
minority perceived the system as "very fair., 26 Under all of the different catego-
ries of respondents (sex, race, age, education, income, community type, region in
the U.S. and political affiliation), there was a substantially higher percentage of
people who perceived the system as unfair to some extent than those who. per-
ceived it as "very fair." In other words, if the appearance of justice is as important
24. Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924) (emphasis added).
25. Olson & Dzur, supra note 1, at 62.
26. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook
of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (2003) [hereinafter Sourcebook], available at www.albany.edu
/sourcebook (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
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as is often stated, the system has much to improve. As will be shown, restorative
practices have much to contribute to this aspect of legal proceedings.
B. Is restorative justice able to amend these deficiencies?
Before examining whether restorative practices have the ability to amend the
deficiencies specified above, it is important to enumerate some of the major prem-
ises of the restorative justice theory and provide a working definition for restora-
tive practices that are based on this theory.
1. What is restorative justice?
The restorative justice paradigm shifts the traditional view of crime from the
violated norm to the harm caused to the individuals most affected by the crime. In
CHANGING LENSES, Zehr provides a short but thorough description of what he
calls "the restorative lens." Zehr describes the restorative lens as the view that
"crime is a violation of people and relationships. It creates obligations to make
things right. Justice involves the victim, the offender, and the community in a
search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation and reassurance."
27
Although this description is not flawless, it offers a clear understanding of the
restorative justice paradigm. It emphasizes people rather than norms. It high-
lights the obligation imposed on offenders, holding them accountable for the of-
fense they committed. It illustrates the necessity of involving the real stake-
holders affected by the criminal offense in the justice process and shifts the objec-
tive of that system from punishment and the infliction of pain to repairing the
harm. These are the basic principles of the restorative justice theory.
One of the flaws of this description lies in the vagueness of the obligation to
"make things right." In fact, it is not always clear what the harm is; let alone how
to amend it. 28 Furthermore, the importance attributed to the role of communities
in the restorative justice theory raises the question of what constitutes a commu-
nity. It is not self-evident to assume that a "community" always exists in urban
life in the 21't century. Another problem is the intensified focus on the victim.
This may well be derived from the words of Randy Barnett, who is sometimes
quoted by restorative justice theorists:
Where we once saw an offense against society we now see an offense
against an individual victim. In a way, it is a common sense view of
crime. The armed robber did not rob society; he robbed the victim. His
debt therefore, is not to society; it is to the victim.
29
27. ZEHR, supra note 16, at 181.
28. For the common answer to the question of what does it take to "make things right?", see JOHN
BRArrHwArrE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11 (2002) [hereinafter
BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE] ("whatever dimensions of restoration matter to the victims,
offenders and communities affected by the crime. Stakeholder deliberation determines what restoration
means in a specific context.").
29. RANDY E. BARNETr & JOHN HAGEL III, ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 363 (1977).
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However, Barnett's view does not reflect the restorative justice paradigm, but
is better defined as the Restitution Approach to criminal justice. 30 Although the
latter method shares with the restorative approach a strong emphasis on victim
compensation, it differs from the restorative approach in calling for the abolish-
ment of criminal law as a separate body of law. Every crime has both a public and
private dimension. Instead of focusing almost solely on the offender and the pub-
lic dimension and neglecting to address the private dimension of the victim, the
restorative justice theory advocates for a better balance between the two. Restora-
tive justice does not promote a system which totally focuses on victims. That is
the realm of civil and tort law, which cannot use state power and punishment in to
respond to crime. As of today, restorative justice practices operate as alternative
processes within the criminal justice system. They are all part of the public at-
tempt to find a justifiable, efficient and effective response to crime, and therefore
should be considered as a complementary component of the criminal justice sys-
tem.
2. What are restorative justice practices?
The difference between the traditional criminal justice system and restorative
justice dictates the use of different methods in responding to crime. In the tradi-
tional criminal justice system, the first question is whether a legal norm defining a
criminal offense was violated, and if so, what is it. The second question is how do
you prove who violated the law. The third question concerns the consequences of
the violation and the appropriate punishment for the offender. The restorative
justice paradigm follows a different path. Its starting point is the harm caused to
victims and their needs in the aftermath of the offense. A victim-centered discus-
sion begins any restorative justice practice. Then the discussion turns to the of-
fenders and demands that they be held accountable for their wrongdoing in both
dimensions of the crime: privately, towards the victim and the closely affected
community; and publicly, towards society in general. 3' The proceedings are not
controlled 'by detached professionals but rather by the people and community
affected by the crime, 32 through a deliberative process facilitated by at least one
trained neutral facilitator. The victim is no longer regarded merely as a witness,
but is granted a substantial role in the justice system. At the same time, the of-
30. In the words of Barnett himself: "I propose that [the breakdown of our system of criminal jus-
tice] could be solved by the adoption of a new paradigm of criminal justice-restitution." Id. at 349.
See also Conrad G. Brunk, Restorative Justice and the Philosophical Theories of Criminal Punish-
ment, in THE SPIRITUAL ROOTS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 31, 43 (Michael L. Hadley ed. 2001) (pro-
viding a summary of the restitution approach to criminal justice).
31. The theoretical concept of offender accountability will often be manifested through a wide
variety of specific actions the offender undertakes in the restoration agreement, which cater to both the
private and public dimensions of crime. These may include: monetary compensation to the victim,
community service work, treating a substance or alcohol abuse problem, getting a job, continuing
education toward the GED test or professional certification, etc.
32. Barb Toews Shenk and Howard Zehr, Ways of Knowing for a Restorative Worldview, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND DIRECTIONS 257 (Weitekamp &
Kerner eds. 2003) [hereinafter Shenk & Zehr]. See also D. Van Ness, Proposed Basic Principles on
the Use of Restorative Justice: Recognizing the Aims and Limits of Restorative Justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 157
(Von Hirsch, Roberts & Bottoms eds. 2003).
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fender will not be taken through the judicial process passively, but will be con-
fronted with the full consequences of the wrongdoing, and is expected to take an
active role in making amends and helping the victim and the community to heal.
The most acceptable working definition for a restorative justice practice was
offered by Tony Marshal and endorsed by John Braithwaite, one of the leading
authorities in the field: "A process whereby all the parties with a stake in a par-
ticular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the after-
math of the offense and its implications for the future." 33 The purpose of the proc-
ess is to "restore victims, restore offenders, and restore communities in a way that
all stakeholders can agree is just."34 The questions of "what" must be restored and
"how" this restoration is to be fulfilled are answered by the participants in the
restorative process, as they become empowered to make these decisions on their
own.
After establishing a basic understanding of the restorative justice principles
and the main characteristics of the way they are practiced, we may then examine
how restorative practices can better deal with the deficiencies of the criminal jus-
tice system.
C. How restorative justice addresses these deficiencies
1. Restorative justice and crime victims
The first deficiency mentioned above concerned the fundamental disregard of
crime victims in the criminal justice system. Due to this disregard, it would seem
logical to assume that any alternative process which provides for some degree of
victim participation would address this deficiency better than the current system.
Since the restorative paradigm turns to the affected parties of the crime and brings
forth their perspectives as well as the harm they have suffered individually, it
seems self-evident that it has the ability to offer victims a promising and improved
alternative.
But this, alone, is not enough for two reasons. First, one must take into ac-
count potential risks to victims. Designing a process in which victims and offend-
ers meet face-to-face involves an inherent risk of physical and emotional harm to
the victim. There may be some reasons for an offender to try to physically hurt
the victim, from revenge for being charged or arrested to an attempt to prevent the
victim from testifying in court (by intimidation or physical incapacitation). But
even if the risk of physical harm is neutralized by technical means in addition to
the presence of a skilled facilitator (holding the restorative process in a guarded
facility, seating the parties in such a way as to preclude the possibility of harming
each other, etc.) there is still the risk of emotional harm to the victim-
revictimization. For this to occur offenders could take control over the conversa-
tion, belittle the trauma expressed by the victim, state they are not remorseful for
their actions or even merely signal some disrespect towards the victim or the
process by minute body gestures. All of these may cause the victim to relive the
33. BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 11.
34. John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian? 46
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Punishment].
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trauma that resulted from the first encounter with the offender, the one that led to
the current meeting. Before allowing victims and their offenders to meet, one
must take all necessary steps to reduce the risk of revictimization. 35 This can be
achieved by professional screening of the cases referred to restorative practices,
sufficient preparation of all parties partaking in the restorative process and con-
trolling the discussion during the actual meeting by the intervention of a trained
facilitator.
Second, even if we can successfully minimize the risks to an acceptable level
and find restorative justice does indeed offer victims a process that better ad-
dresses their concerns, one must assess whether the improvement is worth a com-
plete change of the current justice paradigm. It may be argued (as it often is) that
crime victims do not really wish to participate in the legal proceedings, but merely
to be timely informed of their developments; that crime victims are dissatisfied
with the current system because they perceive it as too lenient with their offend-
ers; and most of all, that a crime victim would not want to meet face-to-face with
his or her offender. It is possible that crime victims would not want to spend addi-
tional time with their offenders, let alone in a process that may lead to a mitigated
sentence or the sealing of their files without a criminal conviction. In order to
deal with these arguments, and ultimately answer our primary concern-whether
the benefit is worth the paradigm change-it would be wise to observe what crime
victims actually have to say on these matters.
Research in this area has steadily shown that crime victims do not center their
criticism on the leniency of the sentences imposed on their offenders, but rather on
the precise fundamental deficiency pointed out above-their inability to partici-
pate in the legal proceedings concerning the criminal acts to which they were
victim. 36 This participation includes, according to studies, receiving information
about their cases, a fair and respectful opportunity to be consulted with, and the
recognition of all aspects of the harm they suffered, emotional as well as mate-
rial.37 Restorative processes provide victims with just that since, in part, that is
35. It may be argued that the risk of revictimization ought to be neutralized completely before allow-
ing a face-to-face meeting between a victim and offender to occur. However, I do not believe this
effort is possible. Even in the current criminal justice system, the offender may attempt to harm the
victim in many different ways. Moreover, it is a well-known phenomenon that many crime victims are
revictimized during the legal proceedings, not by their offender, but by the system itself. This is re-
ferred to as "critogenic harm." See Mary P. Koss, Karen J. Bacher & C. Quince Hopkins, An Innova-
tive Application of Restorative Justice to the Adjudication of Selected Sexual Offenses, in CRIME PRE-
VENTION-NEW APPROACHES 7 (H. Kury & J. Obergfell-Fuchs eds., 2003) ("criminal justice response
often disappoints and traumatizes victims"). If both the victim and offender are prepared for the meet-
ing, and all necessary steps are taken to minimize the risk of revictimization, beginning with the initial
screening of the case, followed by the preparation process and continuing with actual control of the
'meeting, in addition to a professional assessment that revictimization is not likely to occur, a face-to-
face meeting should be enabled.
36. Heather Strang & Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm: Victims and Restorative Justice,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18 [hereinafter Strang & Sherman].
37. Id. at 18 (citing MIKE MAGUIRE, BURGLARY IN A DWELLING: THE OFFENSE, THE OFFENDER
AND THE VICTIM 134-38 (1982); LESLIE SEBBA, THIRD PARTIES: VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 104-06 (1996); JOANNA SHAPLAND ET AL., VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 47-50
(1985); Joanna Shapland, Victims and the Criminal Justice System, in FROM CRIME POLICY TO VICTIM
POLICY: REORIENTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 210, 214-16 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1986); HEATHER
STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 2-3 (2002); IRvIN WALLER &
NORMAN OKIHIRO, BURGLARY: THE VICTIM AND THE PUBLIC 45-46 (1978)).
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what they are all about. The results of Heather Strang's RISE study 38 sufficiently
support this argument. In her study, Strang examined 275 cases over a five-year
period, from 1995 to 2000.39 These cases involved property crimes committed by
juvenile offenders and middle-range violent crimes committed by young adults in
Canberra, Australia. These cases were disposed of randomly either by the courts,
in the traditional fashion, or by a restorative justice conference. A restorative
justice conference is a facilitated meeting between offenders and victims, along
with each party's supporters.
As mentioned above, victims want more information about the proceedings
against their offenders and the outcome of those proceedings. When asked
whether they were informed "in good time" about developments in their cases,
victims' responses varied greatly between the cases handled by the courts and
those referred to conferences. In the former, "victims were rarely told anything
officially about their case when they were not required as witnesses."4 This find-
ing especially stands out due to the existence of specific legislation providing
victims with the right to be informed of progress in the proceedings. 4' In the cases
dealt with in a conference, on the other hand, all victims had the opportunity to be
as involved and informed as they wished.42
Almost all restorative processes follow the same pattern, regardless of the
process-type. After the preparation stage is successfully completed, programs
typically hold a meeting. In the RISE study, for example, the meeting was con-
vened in the form of a family-group conference, but it can be held in any other
forum or type of process. In this meeting, the parties are encouraged to talk about
38. Lawrence W. Sherman, Heather S. Strang & Daniel J. Woods, Recidivism Patterns in the Can-
berra Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (RISE) (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter RISE Final Report] (unpub-
lished report of findings from the RISE project), available at http://www.aic.gov.aujustice/rise
/recidivism/report.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2005). See Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 25. See
also HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 63 (2002).
39. STRANG, supra note 38, at 63; Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 25.
40. Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 26.
41. See Victims of Crime Act, 1994, c. 4 (Austl.), available at http://www.legislation.act.gov.au
/a/1994-83/current/pdf/1994-83.pdf. The Victims of Crime Act states:
4. Governing principles
In the administration of justice, the following principles are to, as far as practicable and appropri-
ate, govern the treatment of victims:
(a) a victim should be dealt with at all times in a sympathetic, constructive and reassuring way
and with appropriate regard to his or her personal situation, rights and dignity;
(b) a victim should be told at reasonable intervals (generally not more than 1 month) of the pro-
gress of police investigations about the relevant offense, except if the disclosure might jeopardize
the investigation, and, in that case, the victim should be told accordingly;
(c) a victim should be told about the charges laid against the accused and of any modification of
the charges;
(d) a victim should be told about any decision concerning the accused to accept a plea of guilty to
a lesser charge or a guilty plea in return for a recommendation of leniency in sentencing;
(e) a victim should told about of any decision not to proceed with a charge against the accused;
(f) if any victim's property is held by the Territory for the purposes of investigation or evidence
-inconvenience to the victim should be minimized and the property returned promptly;
(g) a victim should be told about the trial process and of the rights and responsibilities of wit-
nesses;
(h) a victim should be protected from unnecessary contact with the accused and defence wit-
nesses during the course of the trial.
Id.
42. Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 26-27.
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the facts of the criminal event, share with one another how the event affected their
lives, and finally work toward a written restitution agreement.43 The victim is not
only given a "counseling" status, but is invited to take an active role in the process
and the formation of the restitution agreement. As we have seen earlier, this is far
from being the case in the criminal justice system. The Australian "Victims of
Crime Act" (Act) sets a good example of victims' treatment by the justice system.
In this Act, victims have a right to be told about various aspects of their case, but
never to be consulted. Even in the United States Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, where the court "must address any victim of a crime of violence or sexual
abuse who is present . . . and must permit the victim to speak," the words of a
victim are not part of the considerations a judge must take into account when sen-
tencing a defendant. 44 It is apparent that restorative justice provides victims with
processes that more deeply engage them than the criminal justice system.
How do restorative justice practices perform with regards to victims' needs to
have their emotional and financial harm recognized? One of the most common
ways for a person to acknowledge harming another is to apologize. This is the
customary way of communicating to the other that we understand our wrongdo-
ing, and of recognizing the harm done to the other. In the RISE study, 86% of the
victims who attended a restorative justice conference received apologies from
their offenders.45 In court, the percentage was only 16% of the victims. 46 The
difference speaks for itself.47 But what about the financial harm caused to the
victim? As a number of studies show, here too, restorative justice tends to per-
form better than the criminal justice system. A vast majority of restorative proc-
esses results in a restitution agreement, in which offenders undertake to compen-
sate their victims for their monetary losses. Studies show that these agreements
enjoy a significantly higher compliance rate by offenders than court-ordered resti-
tution decrees.48
It seems, then, that restorative justice provides crime victims with a process
that answers their most important needs: for participation, involvement and ac-
knowledgement. The problem is, however, that this conclusion rests on the as-
sumption that victims want to participate in restorative processes and, in fact, do
43. Mark S. Umbreit, FACT SHEET: VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
THROUGH DIALOGUE, 1 (1997) [hereinafter Umbreit, FACT SHEET], http://ssw.che.umn.edu/jp
/Resources/Documents/cumb97d.pdf See also Leena Kurki, Evaluating Restorative Justice Practices,
in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 293,
297-303 (Andrew Von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).
44. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B) (2000).
45. RISE Final Report, supra note 38.
46. Id.
47. It is important to bear in mind, however, that not all apologies are authentic or sincere, and not
all include the recognition of any kind of culpability on the part of the apologizing person. See gener-
ally Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999); Erin Ann
O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121 (2002); Lee Taft,
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000) (all three articles
analyze the role of apology in the legal system, and identify and suggest different types of apologies
for various functions in the legal system).
48. Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 34; Jeff Latimer & Steven Kleinknecht, The Effects of
Restorative Justice Programming: A Review of the Empirical (Jan. 2000) (unpublished research re-
view), available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/rrOO-16a-e.pdf (stating the findings of dif-
ferent studies, among them a 1994 study that found a restitution completion rate of 81 % in restorative
justice compared to only 58% in court).
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partake in these proceedings. As it turns out, the merits of this assumption may
not be valid. On one hand, studies point out a general willingness in the public,
and among crime victims, to consider victim offender mediation in cases of non-
violent juvenile offenders.49 Interestingly, some studies show a correlation be-
tween the victims' emotional response to the crime and their willingness to meet
their offenders: the more victims feel emotionally upset by the offense, the more
likely they are to agree to meet their offenders and to be open to reparation by the
offender. 0 On the other hand, in practice, only a minority of victims both agree
to, and actually participate in, the process. 5' In addition, restorative justice practi-
tioners also experience difficulties when introducing this alternative process to
crime victims.
5
If that is the case, then one might ask, "why bother?" If victims do not wish
to participate in restorative processes, shouldn't it be inferred that despite its great
promise to victims, restorative justice is simply not appealing enough for them?
Encountering practical difficulties in introducing a new paradigm of justice to the
public is not surprising at all and should not deter innovative efforts to improve
our criminal justice system. First, the studies cited above show the public at large,
and crime victims in particular are generally supportive of these innovations. But
more importantly, if anything, these studies show that victims at least want to be
asked for their preferences, and that they value being given the option to choose
49. See Mark S. Umbreit, Restorative Justice Through Victim-Offender Mediation: A Multi-Site
Assessment, W. CRIMINOLOGY REv. (1998) [hereinafter Umbreit, Victim-Offender Mediation], avail-
able at http://wcr.sonoma.edu/vlnl /umbreit.html (citing a study by VORP, Orange County, Califor-
nia-the largest victim-offender mediation program in North America, with over 1,000 referrals a
year-that "found that 75 percent of victims of minor property and personal offenses were interested in
participating in the mediation process." Umbreit then cites two other studies, performed by him, that
found that "70 percent of victims who were never even referred to mediation indicated their interest in
meeting with the juvenile offender if the opportunity were presented to them," and that "82 percent of
citizens (many of whom were crime victims) indicated that he or she would be likely to consider par-
ticipating in a mediation session with a juvenile or young adult offender if he or she were the victim of
a nonviolent property crime"). See also Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 18 (citing victim surveys
conducted in Britain, the later of which found that "over 40% of British crime victims surveyed said
they would have accepted the opportunity to meet their offender, and almost 60% of victims said they
would have been willing to accept a reparative activity from their offender").
50. Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 18.
51. See Carolyn Hoyle, Securing Restorative Justice for the 'Non-Participating' Victim, in NEW
VISIONS OF CRIME VICTIMS 97, 103 (Carolyn Hoyle & Richard P. Young eds., 2002) (describing the
findings of a four-year research project that examined three restorative practices in England, where
over 80% of the cases, in which there had been a victim, that victim did not attend the restorative
process).
52. See Susan M. Olson & Albert W. Dzur, Revisiting Informal Justice: Restorative Justice and
Democratic Professionalism, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 139, 169 (2004) (describing difficulties on the
part of restorative justice practitioners in the Salt Lake City "Passages" program to recruit community
volunteers). In Polk County, Iowa, for instance, every crime victim is offered the opportunity to con-
front his or her offender as part of a Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP). During the
years 2001-2004 nearly 9,000 crime victims were given the opportunity to participate in a VORP, but
only slightly over 1,500 were actually held, equaling roughly 17% of all cases. Admittedly, this is not
solely due to lack of victim participation, since many other factors influence the decision to perform a
VORP; however, uninterested victims are among the most dominant factors to affect this outcome.
Interview with David Lerman, Dir., Milwaukee County Dist. Attorney's Office Restorative Justice
Program; interview with Fred Gaye, Dir., Polk County Attorney's Office Restorative Justice Center, in
Des Moines, Iowa; interview with Vicki Shoap, Program Coordinator, 31st Judicial Dist. Circuit Court
Restorative Justice Program, Office of Dispute Resolution, Prince William County, Manassas, Va. (all
interviews on file with author).
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whether or not to participate in the public response to the criminal act that person-
ally affected them. The mere act of asking for their opinion provides an opportu-
nity for crime victims to experience a sense of participation in the proceedings and
gain the minimal assurance that the offender and justice system recognize their
personal harm. For those who choose to partake in the restorative process, the
outcome in the vast majority of cases succeeds in responding to the victims' main
concerns.
53
2. Efficiency and effectiveness in restorative processes
As mentioned previously, utilitarianists may depend on the criminal justice
system to reduce crime and ensure public safety. Based on the data gathered in
recent years, serious doubts arise regarding the effectiveness of our system in
achieving this goal. 54 Moreover, not only are the results of combating crime in-
sufficient, but they come at a great monetary cost. Since the criminal justice sys-
tem is a public mechanism, funded by the public and created for the welfare of the
public, it is our obligation as citizens to demand its improvement and explore
alternatives that have the potential to perform better-both in reducing crime and,
eventually, the resources and funding they require. Restorative justice offers such
an alternative. Admittedly, this argument is somewhat presumptuous and lacks a
well-based empirical foundation. Nonetheless, restorative justice consists of cer-
tain elements that enhance its ability to achieve improved results in reducing
crime, and it does so relatively efficiently. In addition, while the empirical data
gathered to date does not provide conclusive evidence, it does show the potential
that restorative justice has to achieve these goals.
Restorative processes can be implemented during any stage of the criminal
process, in a wide range of offenses, and as such are good candidates for institu-
tionalization and general application. However, among the main determinative
prerequisite factors for the initiation of such a process are the offender's willing-
ness to concede wrongdoing on his or her part, 55 and the parties' agreement to
participate in the process. One may argue that this narrows down the number of
cases that can even be initially considered for restorative justice to a marginalized
number of cases. If so, it may not matter whether restorative processes are effec-
tive and efficient since they cannot be applied to the vast majority of cases in the
criminal justice system. Such marginalization of restorative processes will deem
them irrelevant to any attempts at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of
the criminal justice system. As will be shown, this argument is not valid. Even
with their preconditions, restorative processes are extremely relevant to this analy-
sis.
A close examination of the way cases are disposed of in the justice system
will prove the above argument wrong. It is not a new figure, and it is definitely
not surprising, that 95% of all criminal cases in federal and state courts in the
53. Strang & Sherman, supra note 36, at 27-28; Latimer & Kleinknecht, supra note 48, at 14 (citing
a study that found "83% of victims in conference cases versus 8% of victims in court cases, received
both reparation and an apology from the offender").
54. See infra part Il.a.2.
55. This may or may not require entering a guilty plea in court or admitting to the crime before a
police officer, depending on the jurisdiction and the different restorative justice programs.
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United States result in guilty pleas, usually by plea-bargain. 56 This figure is im-
portant to the examination of the relevancy of restorative justice to the criminal
justice system in two ways. First, it indicates that in almost all cases, the offender
is willing to assume responsibility for his or her behavior (by pleading guilty),
fulfilling the initial precondition for a restorative process. Second, it negates the
general assumption that disposition of criminal cases is not a matter for discussion
and negotiation, but rather a matter for adjudication. Plea-bargaining, the primary
means of disposing criminal cases, is all about negotiation, in which the subject of
discussion is both the specific circumstances of the offense and the appropriate
way of concluding the case. In restorative processes, the circumstances of the
offense are discussed but are not subject to negotiation, but the resolution of the
case is subject to negotiation between the parties, just as in plea-bargaining. The
one exception is that a neutral third party facilitates the resolution in restorative
processes.
The second precondition for the initiation of a restorative process-the par-
ties' consent to participate-poses a more difficult problem. One of the greatest
sources of power in the criminal justice system is that it does not require the con-
sent of any party. In appropriate cases, the police will investigate a crime irre-
spective of the victim's wish, and offenders can be indicted and tried despite the
victim's efforts to prevent it. This feature of the criminal justice system enables it
to be applicable to all cases, as a systematic and well-defined response to crime.
This feature does not exist in restorative practices, leaving them vulnerable to the
changing whims of individual parties. For this reason, I do not contend that re-
storative justice should entirely replace the current system. Instead, I call for its
implementation as the process of first-resort in appropriate cases 57 (which in my
view consist of a substantial number of cases in the criminal justice system). This
would leave the current system to deal with all other cases as the default process.
It is important to note that in cases of non-cooperative victims and interested of-
fenders, restorative justice practitioners are developing innovative solutions, such
as the use of "surrogate" victims or community members, 58 thus mitigating to
56. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2001 55 (2003) available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjspub/pdf/cfjs0l.pdf;
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED
FELONS, 2000 43 (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdflscscf0O.pdf.
57. The question of identifying "appropriate cases" for restorative justice programs is not a simple
one and tends to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For instance, in Polk County, Iowa, all crime
victims are given the opportunity to meet their offender, regardless of the type of offense committed.
See Fred Gaye, supra note 52. In many other jurisdictions, restorative processes are applied only to
non-violent property offenses or only to juvenile delinquency. In practice today, the scope of "appro-
priate cases" is determined locally and incorporates the special needs and characteristics of each differ-
ent jurisdiction. It is important to note, however, that restorative justice has its limitations. Not all
cases or offenders are capable of participating in these deliberative-type processes and there may be
certain categories of crime in which the application of a restorative process may be impractical or
inappropriate. The question of the limits of restorative justice is an important one--one that requires
much discussion which extends beyond the scope of this article. On this subject, see Barbara Hudson,
Restorative Justice and Gendered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice? 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY
616 (2002) (exploring the limitations of restorative justice, especially in regard to domestic violence
and sexual assault). See also BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 137.
58. See The Report of the Dept. of Admin., Milwaukee County Dist. Attorney's Office, Restorative
Justice Coordinator Report (unpublished report made pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 978.044(3) (2003),
submitted February 13, 2004, at p. ., on file with author) (introducing "Modified Conferences" con-
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some extent the practical implications of this vulnerability. In addition, a multi-
state study conducted by Umbreit in 1994 found that 72% of juvenile offenders
tried by the court indicated they would have chosen to participate in mediation
had they been given the opportunity. 59 This too, is an indicator that the inclusion
of restorative justice within our criminal justice system has the potential of dealing
with a significant number of cases, thereby affecting the entire system.
Is restorative justice effective? One of the main factors in determining the
answer to this question is the rate in which known offenders go back to offend-
ing. 6° As mentioned before, studies that followed released inmates for a measured
length of time (usually, between one to three years) revealed relatively high rates
of re-offense and re-arrests due to continued criminal activity. 61 Hypothetically, if
it can be proven that restorative processes achieve lower recidivism rates, it may
be concluded that they are more effective in reducing crime than the current sys-
tem. The problem is, however, that in practice this is difficult to prove due to
different definitions of recidivism and the many variables that influence re-
offense rates. 63 In addition, restorative processes are currently applied to rela-
tively small numbers of offenders, leaving researchers with a limited population in
which every individual offender has significant influence on the research out-
come. Therefore, the results described here should be taken with caution.
Currently, most empirical studies conducted in this area show that restorative
processes have a positive effect on recidivism rates. However, it is important to
note that some studies do not share this conclusion and, of those, some even show
an increase in recidivism rates. One of the better-known examples for this last
result is the increase in offending by drunk drivers found in the RISE study (by six64
crimes per 100 offenders per year.) On the other hand, the same study found a
substantial drop in offending rates by violent offenders (by 38 crimes per 100
ducted in specific circumstances where the victim is not interested in participating or there is no identi-
fiable victim).
59. Umbreit, Victim-Offender Mediation, supra note 49.
60. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., Rethinking the Criminal Justice System: Toward a New Paradigm, in
PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: DISCUSSION PAPERS FROM THE BJS-
PRINCETON PROJECT 1, 11 (1993), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pmcjs.pdf.
61. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 19.
62. For example, recidivism can be defined only as a re-conviction, or include a re-arrest with no
conviction disposition available on the post-release criminal history record or even the revocation of
probation or post-prison supervision. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE
CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 4-5 (2004), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism General.pdf.
63. Such as: age and gender of offender, race and ethnicity, employment status, education attain-
ment, marital status and illicit drug use. See id at 11-15.
64. RISE Final Report, supra note 38, at 13. There are a few factors that offer a partial explanation
for this finding. The first, brought by Sherman, Strang and Woods, in page 14 of the report, is that
drivers' licenses are usually suspended in court proceedings whereas restorative conferences do not
have the power to do this. Id. at 14. Another explanation, provided by Braithwaite, is that while the
conferences dealt with the specific crime of drinking and driving, they did not confront the underlying
drinking problem. BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 62. In my opinion, there is
another plausible explanation: the lack of a victim. In these cases, the offenders were detected by the
police by random breath testing. Research shows a certain relation between a face-to-face meeting of
victims and offenders and a drop in recidivism and compliance rates. See Hoyle, supra note 51, at 112
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offenders per year.)65 In any case, even if not considered to be solid proof of the
effectiveness of restorative processes, the cumulative effect of the recidivism stud-
ies in the area of restorative processes provides a strong indication of the potential
of these processes. For example, a meta-analysis conducted by Umbreit, aimed at
searching for "evidence that VOM [victim offender mediation] participation is
related to a decrease in the prevalence or severity of subsequent delinquent behav-
ior,"66 found "a clear relationship between VOM participation and subsequent
delinquent behavior. ' '67 According to this meta-analysis, after neutralizing the
differences in definition of recidivism among the analyzed studies and other rele-
vant variables, VOM participants were found to re-offend at a rate varying be-
tween 9% to nearly 27% lower than that of non-participants. 6 8 Other studies show
a reduction of approximately 20% in recidivism rates for offenders who partici-
pated in different types of restorative processes, although some findings demon-
strate smaller differences and others differences reaching as high as a 38% reduc-
tion in recidivism. 69 In addition, many of these studies found that in cases where
participants in restorative processes did re-offend, this involved less serious of-
fenses than those committed by non-participants. 70 This data is important for two
reasons: First, even a 9% reduction in recidivism rates is a substantial improve-
ment and should not be taken lightly. Second, the fact that numerous studies,
analyzing different programs in different countries, all find a certain improvement
in recidivism rates among participants of restorative processes shows that apply-
ing a new paradigm of justice does not risk endangering the public by irresponsi-
ble experimentation with potentially dangerous people. On the contrary, it shows
that this new paradigm consists of correct and useful measures, which perhaps
require additional honing but are definitely worth working on.
Toews and Zehr argue that one of the most fundamental elements of justice is
achieved by giving meaning to the actions taken in response to crime.7' This
meaning must be "constructed from the perspectives and experiences of those
,,72most affected: victim, offender and perhaps community members. Since this
notion is so fundamental to restorative practices, it should not come as a surprise
65. RISE Final Report, supra note 38 , at 12.
66. William. R. Nugent, Mona Williams and Mark S. Umbreit, Participation in Victim Offender
Mediation and the Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 137, 139.
67. Id. at 163.
68. Id. (during the first six months after involvement in VOM, participants recidivate at a rate nearly
27% lower than non-participants. After thirty months, the reduction in recidivism rate goes down to
9%).
69. Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, The Impact of Restorative Justice Conferenc-
ing: A Review of 63 Empirical Studies in 5 Countries 12-15 (May 1, 2002) [hereinafter Umbreit,
Conferencing], at http://2ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp/Resources/RJP%20CONFERENCING-mono%205-5-
02.pdf. See also BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 55-62 (describing a particu-
larly interesting study by Michael Little who examined the effects of applying restorative processes to
persistent juvenile offenders in Kent, England. Little found a statistically significant reduction in re-
arrest during two years of follow-up after the application of a "multisystemic approach that involved a
family group conference, joint and heightened supervision by police and social services staff, and
improved assessment combined with an individual treatment plan and mentoring by a young volun-
teer").
70. Umbreit, Conferencing, supra note 69, at 16-17.
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that restorative justice has the potential to reduce recidivism rates. In the criminal
justice system, offenders are taken through the system without requiring them to
take any action at all, even when they plead guilty. Moreover, the current system
encourages offenders not to assume responsibility (since the high burden of proof
is entirely on the prosecution) and to remain as passive (and often as quiet) as
possible. As a result, many defendants do not find their trial to be a meaningful
event, but rather a detached occurrence, unrelated to them, run by lawyers and
judges. Detached and unrelated events have little effect on the way people per-
ceive themselves and the morality of their actions. If most offenders are not en-
gaged in a process that challenges their current perceptions and encourages them
to reevaluate their own behavior, what would prevent them from going back to
committing the same actions in the future, once they get the chance? In restora-
tive practices, the offenders are active participants in the process. They are ex-
pected to tell their stories, answer questions, explain their motives, and most of all
listen to the victim and community members and agree on a way they will help
repair the harm they caused. Through offenders' active participation, restorative
processes are given meaning. It is this unique meaning that raises the hope that
participating offenders might be less likely to commit further crimes in the fu-
ture.73
Is restorative justice cost-efficient and time-efficient? As with recidivism
studies, it is difficult to provide conclusive data supporting a determination re-
garding the cost-effectiveness of restorative processes. One of the main reasons
for this difficulty is that these programs, when found, are relatively small, there-
fore having a marginal effect on the criminal justice system. Costs and recourses
needed to support programs of this sort tend to vary greatly, depending on the
number of cases they are required to handle, the amount of time spent on each
case and the logistical structure of each individual program. On the other hand, I
believe restorative justice may have the potential to reduce costs while, as shown
above, improving the effectiveness of the public response to crime.
The first way in which restorative processes can help improve the efficiency
of the criminal justice system is by diverting all appropriate cases away from the
standard court proceedings. By doing so, all costs incurred during those court
proceedings, i.e. judicial and prosecutorial time and resources, the costs of grand-
jury convening, etc., are altogether avoided. Admittedly, the restorative process
itself requires certain expenses, but those are often substantially lower. For exam-
73. A study aimed at finding a connection between increased respect for law enforcement agencies
and recidivism rates sets a good example in support of my argument. Lawrence W. Sherman, Heather
Strang & Daniel J. Woods, Captains of Restorative Justice: Experience, Legitimacy and Recidivism by
Type of Offence, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT, INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND DIRECTIONS
229 (Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Kerner eds., 2003). The results of the study examined different types
of offenses. Id. Drunk diiving offenders, randomly assigned either to court or a restorative justice
conference, were followed for a period of two to four years. Id. The study found that "the average risk
of repeat offending for offenders reporting increased respect for police was less than half that for
offenders who came away from the legal process reporting no change or a decrease in their respect for
police." Id. at 242. A previous study, conducted by Strang, showed that restorative justice conferences
are far more effective than courts in producing increased respect for police. Id. at 237. This increase
in respect for a law enforcement agency is in fact an increase in the perceived legitimacy of the crimi-
nal justice system, which is an important factor in furthering compliance with the law. Id. This is a
result of a process that manages to engage offenders in reassessing their values and therefore has the
power to influence its participants in positive ways.
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pie, the city of Chilliwack in British Columbia, Canada founded the "Chilliwack
Restorative Justice & Youth Diversion Association" to deal with first time youth
and adult offenders in certain categories of offenses. 74 A cost-benefit analysis
conducted during the fiscal year of 2001 revealed that while the total cost of a
case referred to the restorative justice program is $80, the cost of dealing with the
same case through the court system would total $2649.50. Since the Chilliwack
Restorative Justice program handles an average of 100 referrals per year, the local
criminal justice system is saving approximately $260,000 per year. In Hender-
son County, North Carolina, researchers found a two-thirds reduction in the num-
ber of trials due to the operation of a restorative process, leaving a substantial
impact at the county level.76
The second way restorative processes can be used to increase the efficiency of
the criminal justice system is by offering an alternative to the main mechanism for
punishing offenders in the current system-imprisonment. 7 In the case of R., the
prosecution had little choice but to argue that the appropriate punishment was
imprisonment. While there is a need for an unequivocal condemnation of the
defendant's negligence (such as incarceration), it does not mean that it is the only
way to express such condemnation. By allowing the affected parties to decide on
an appropriate outcome through a deliberative process, society can broaden its
mechanisms of expressing public condemnation in more innovative yet equally
effective means. For example, Genesee County, New York has been diverting
convicted offenders to community service sentencing as a substitute for impris-
onment since 1981. 7 The County reports taxpayer savings of $3,990,000, the
amount saved by avoiding the expense of $70 per day per inmate for the aggregate
sum of 57,000 jail days. 79 Another example can be found in a study conducted on
the Restorative Resolutions Project in Manitoba, Canada, which found that most
offenders referred to the program would have received a prison sentence had they
gone through the court system.
80
Finally, one of the most indicative elements of efficiency in any system is the
amount of time invested in order to produce the desired outcome. Here too, re-
storative processes have the potential to perform better than the criminal justice
system. For example, during the 2003 fiscal year it took an average of six months
from the time of filing to dispose of a case in which the defendant pled guilty in
74. See City of Chilliwack-Chilliwack Restorative Justice and Youth Diversion Association,
http://www.gov.chilliwack.bc.ca/main/page.cfm?id=178 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
75. See City of Chilliwack-Cost-Benefit Analysis, http://www.gov.chilliwack.bc.calmain/attach-
ments/files/178/Cost-Benefit-Analysis.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Chilliwack Cost-
Benefit Analysis].
76. Umbreit, Conferencing, supra note 69, at 16 (citing a study by Clarke, Valente, Jr. & Mace).
77. "In 2002, 69% of all felons convicted in State courts were sentenced to a period of confine-
ment." Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Sentencing, Summary Findings at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
govlbjs/sent.htm; (last visited Nov. 14, 2005); Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal justice system,
Sentencing at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/fed.htm#Sentencing (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
78. See Genesee County, NY-Official Website, Genesee Justice Progress Report, at http://www.
co.genesee.ny.us/frameset.html?/dptcommunityservices/csprogressO52604.html&I (last visited Nov.
14, 2005).
79. Id.
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U.S. District Courts. 8' During this period, the case is assigned to a U.S. attorney
and federal judge and in many cases to a public defender and to other agencies
with responsibilities relevant to the particular defendant. All of these participants
invest substantial amounts of time during these six months until final disposition.
In restorative justice, this is not usually the case. In most restorative programs,
once the case has been referred and screened by the program staff members, it will
be assigned to a facilitator, who will actually prepare the parties and facilitate their
meeting. 82 Typically, cases can be dealt with in a few hours, and offenders do not
necessarily require legal representation. As a result, costs of restorative processes
are often substantially lower than the criminal justice system.83 The cost-benefit
analysis conducted by Chilliwack Restorative Justice & Youth Diversion Associa-
tion84 provides a good example for this aspect of efficiency as well. According to
the report, the average amount of time needed to dispose of a case in the restora-
tive justice program is 12 hours and 45 minutes.85 This includes administrative
and volunteer hours, beginning with the initial referral and ending when the case
86is completed. In the court system, according to the report, the same exact case
would have required 34.5 hours, which includes administrative time, court time
(two appearances in court), legal services rendered by the defense attorney, proba-
tion officer supervision and community work supervision.87
However, it must be noted that not all types of restorative programs are time-
efficient in comparison to the court system and, due to an overwhelming caseload,
courts may dramatically limit the amount of time spent on each case. For in-
stance, in the RISE study it was shown that while the average court case for drunk
drivers takes six minutes, the average conference takes 88 minutes. 88 Similarly,
while the average court case for young offenders in property and violence offenses
takes 13 minutes, the restorative justice conference requires an average of 71 min-
utes. 89 Another example of a restorative practice that increases expenses can be
found in sentencing circles. This process is conducted after a court finds the of-
81. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu
/sourcebook/pdf/t543.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
82. In most restorative programs, once a case has been referred, a representative will contact the
victim and offender, often by telephone, and introduce the program to them. If they are willing to
participate in the program, both parties will undergo a preparation stage, which typically will include
separate meetings with a volunteer facilitator or program manager. Although this stage is often re-
garded as most important and most time-consuming, it usually consists of one or slightly more meet-
ings with the offender and victim. Then, a face-to-face meeting between the victim and offender will
be arranged, typically lasting for an hour and half to two hours. For more detail on the process, see
Umbreit, a simulated demonstration videotape "Complete Victim Offender Mediation and Conferenc-
ing Training," Center for Restorative Justice & Peacemaking, University of Minnesota. The outfine of
the process can be found in Mark S. Umbreit and Jean Greenwood, National Survey of Victim Of-
fender Mediation Programs in the U.S., 4, 12-19 (1998), at http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rjp (last visited
Nov. 14, 2005).
83. See Latimer & Kleinknecht, supra note 48, at 14.





89. Lawrence W. Sherman and Heather Strang , Restorative Justice and Deterring Crime, Australian
National University, Canberra, RISE Working Papers, no. 4 (April 1997), available at
http://www.aic.gov.au/rjusticetrise/working/risepap4.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
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fender guilty or after he or she is willing to assume responsibility for the offense.
The sentencing circle brings together the victim, the offender, their peers, their
family, and respected community members. However, unlike other types of re-
storative practices, here, the sentencing judge, the lawyers and the police are ac-
tive participants as well. 9° The practical implications of such involvement are an
immediate increase in the amount of time the judges and lawyers must invest in
the sentencing stages of the trials they handle. Participation in a sentencing circle
requires a few hours, while sentencing arguments and judgment can often be
completed within minutes.
9 1
As shown above, studies show that restorative processes have the potential to
be both more efficient and more effective than the criminal justice system. It is
also clear that the two are indispensably connected to each other, since a criminal
justice system cannot decide to cut its expenses, resources and amount of time
invested in each case without accounting for the predictable outcome of such a
cut. Likewise, a system's efficiency cannot be evaluated without considering its
effectiveness. In other words, there is a price for devoting 13 minutes of court
time to a young offender. That price can be embodied in high recidivism rates, in
a basic lack of respect for the law and law enforcement agencies and perhaps, as
mentioned above, in the belief that the criminal justice system does not do justice.
Restorative justice offers an entirely different paradigm, which, as studies indi-
cate, can improve the outcome and lower the expense. Although these studies are
insufficient to prove the extent to which restorative processes reduce recidivism
and costs, they do provide a strong indication of their potential. This, in turn,
justifies expanding the use of such processes and testing their performance in
dealing with larger numbers of cases.
3. The perception of justice in restorative processes
As noted above, a gap exists between the way the justice system expects to be
perceived by its participating parties and the way it is actually perceived. The fact
that the justice system regards the "perception of justice" as fundamentally impor-
tant is not at all surprising, since the public perception of the system's fairness is
part of the foundation of the system's legitimacy. Once the public ceases to be-
lieve in the fairness and justness of the justice system, it will begin questioning its
legitimacy and may, in cases where rulings are considered to be unjust, choose to
deviate from implementing final decisions rendered by the system. Therefore, it is
imperative for the criminal justice system to provide individuals and communities
affected by crime with a process they perceive as fair and just.
It is in this category that restorative justice substantially and almost undisput-
edly outperforms the criminal justice system. A recently published meta-study,
analyzing seven published studies which evaluated the psychological outcomes of
restorative justice and court based programs from around the world, concluded
that the data reviewed was "consistently favorable to restorative justice when
90. For more information on Sentencing Circles, see: "Sentencing Circle: a General Overview and
Guidelines, published by the Native Law Centre of Canada, available at http://www.usask.ca
/nativelaw/publications/jahlcircle.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
91. See Victims of Crime Act, supra note 41, at 18, § 4.2.1.
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compared to adjudication." 92 The seven studies included four evaluations of a
restorative practice model called victim-offender mediation and three evaluations
of a restorative practice model called family group conferencing. The programs
were based in the United States, Canada, England and Australia, and the compara-
tive studies were conducted and published between the late 1970s and 1999. Data
were gathered from a total of 4602 respondents (1297 victims in restorative jus-
tice, 1189 victims in court, 1077 offenders in restorative justice, and 1039 offend-
ers in court). 9 3 The meta-study found that "both victims and offenders in restora-
tive justice were significantly and substantially more likely (3.4 times more likely
for victims and two times more likely for offenders) to believe that the criminal
justice system was fair than were victims or offenders in court. 9 4 In addition,
victims and offenders in restorative justice programs were more likely to believe
that the mediator was fair than victims and offenders in court were to believe the
same thing about the judge (2.3 and 6.0 times more likely for victims and offend-
ers, respectively).95 The same can be said regarding victims' and offenders' belief
that the outcome of the process was fair (2.6 times more likely for all participants
in restorative justice compared to participants in the court system).96 Other stud-
ies, comparing satisfaction rates of victims and offenders who participated in re-
storative practices with those who were parties to court proceedings persistently
showed similar results.9 7 This data shows that the criminal justice system suffers
from a shortcoming in its ability to satisfy the appearance of justice, but more
importantly, it shows that restorative practices, no matter when or where prac-
ticed, have a much better chance of achieving this goal.
1II. Is THE USE OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE JUSTIFIABLE?
After showing that restorative justice has the potential to ensure victims are
treated differently by the justice system, reduce crime rates and costs and improve
the public's regard of the criminal justice system's fairness, it is important to chal-
lenge the theoretical justifications for restorative processes before advocating for
their implementation as an inseparable part of the criminal justice system. In
other words, now that we have seen restorative justice can help amend our justice
system, the question still remains-should restorative justice be used for that pur-
pose? Up to this point, this article has been dedicated to the empirical studies
regarding whether restorative justice is capable of addressing some of the defi-
ciencies in the justice system. The common denominator of those deficiencies is
that they are all consequentialist; they all embody different aspects of only one
side of the criminal justice system-its practical outcome. As desirable as it is to
address these deficiencies, that should not be the primary goal of the criminal
justice system. Moreover, unlike civil law, where alternative practices that em-
92. Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological Out-
comes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167, 201.
93. Id. at 169.
94. Id. at 178.
95. Id. at 185.
96. Id. at 192.
97. See BRArrHWArrE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 47-51 (victim satisfaction), 54-55
(fairness and satisfaction for offenders).
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power parties to determine the outcome of their cases enjoy the solid theoretical
foundation of contract law, criminal law is entirely different. In this arena, not
only are the participating parties different, the objectives are different as well.
According to Immanuel Kant's theory, the preeminent goal of criminal law is
retribution. Punishment is an end in itself,98 not an instrument for achieving other
practical ends (such as reducing crime rates or providing for victims' compensa-
tion and healing). Georg Hegel, who developed Kant's philosophy of retribution,
further provides an explanation for this end goal: crime negates moral law, and
only punishment can restore the negated moral right.99 It may be argued that since
restorative justice aims to reduce the number of offenders punished in the tradi-
tional way, and since it directly contradicts the notion that traditional punish-
ment-the infliction of additional pain on convicted offenders-is the correct
"medicine" for the infringed "moral right," it may be utterly irrelevant and mor-
ally unjustifiable to introduce it as an appropriate process within the justice sys-
tem. 10O
This may also be the inevitable conclusion when analyzing the purposes of
the criminal justice system from an entirely different perspective as well. Utili-
tarianism, as a theory of punishment, justifies criminal penalties when they have
the ability to deter the general public from committing future crimes.' 0 l Assuming
we accept the imposition of community service on an offender in a restitution
agreement as a form of punishment, it undoubtedly has a lesser (if any) general
deterrence effect than its imposition in a court-ordered sentence, due to the latter's
publicity, authority and status. Moreover, an important component of deterrence
is disabling the individual offender from re-offending in the future-
incapacitation. This is precisely what imprisonment achieves and is therefore one
of the main reasons why imprisonment is the "punishment of choice"'10 2 in most
western-world jurisdictions. As mentioned previously, reducing the incarceration
rates and avoiding imprisonment to the greatest extent possible is well within the
stated goals of restorative justice, hence directly negating a basic justification for
punishment and leaving the theory of restorativism unjustifiable in that arena.
In addition, almost by definition, restorative processes "result in grossly un-
equal treatment for equally culpable offenders," '  since the harm resulting from
98. Immanuel Kant, On Punishment, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, reprinted in WHAT IS JUSTICE?
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 252-54 (Robert C. Solomon and Mark C. Murphy eds.,
1990).
99. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, §§ 71, 218-20 (T.M. Knox trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821).
100. See Braithwaite, Punishment, supra note 34, at 1750 ("Restorative justice is a social movement.
•. that might just allow it to transform the criminal justice system by leading to the marginalization of
punishment as the primary method of responding to wrongdoing.").
101. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 165
(J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen: London and New York, 1982). See also Eric Luna,
Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 205,208 (providing a short summary of the principles of utilitarianism).
102. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 591 (1996)
[hereinafter Kahan, Alternative Sanctions].
103. David Dolinko, Restorative Justice and the Justification of Punishment 2003 UTAH L. REV. 319,
337. See also Richard Delgado, Prosecuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community and Justice,
52 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2000) (offering a comprehensive critique of the restorative justice movement.
including inconsistency in punishment for otherwise similar cases). Id.
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the crime and the way to "make things right" 1° 4 are all defined by the particular
participants in the restorative process. 10 5 This is a serious problem both from the
retributive perspective and from a utilitarian point of view.1° 6 Therefore, it must
be asked: even if we grant the positive attributes specified in part one above, is
the use of restorative justice practices within the criminal justice system justifi-
able?
Throughout history, many philosophers developed theories to explain and jus-
tify criminal punishment. Two dominant punishment theories, "utilitarianism"
and "retributivism," have immensely influenced sentencing policies in the major-
ity of jurisdictions in the western world. Additionally, a third approach to pun-
ishment evolved in the early 20'h century and had a tremendous influence on the
criminal justice system for a few decades-the rehabilitative ideal. Although this
latter approach is no longer considered to be predominant in determining sentenc-
ing policies in most jurisdictions, it nevertheless still remains an important objec-
tive for the criminal justice system. Although "punishment theories brutalize one
another, staking out turf on principle and refusing to budge from their respective
positions,"'0 7 in reality, both retributivism and utilitarianism play important roles
in our criminal justice system, often simultaneously, in forming sentencing poli-
cies and justifying punishment for the offenses enumerated in our penal codes.'0 8
Since restorative practices do not relate to the fact-finding role of the criminal
justice system and are focused on offering an alternative process only to its sen-
tencing role, it is necessary to examine the relationship between these punishment
theories and restorative justice.' 9 I am not arguing against either theory; rather, I
hope to legitimize the use of restorative processes by demonstrating its compati-
bility with basic principles of both retributivism and utilitarianism. At the same
time, I want to show the differences between restorative justice and the rehabilita-
tive ideal to a misconception that I am equalizing the two. Hence, I attack the
104. See ZEHR, supra note 16, at 181.
105. See BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28.
106. From a retributive point of view, every offender must be punished according to his "just desert."
Any deviation from that "just desert" constitutes a departure from the norm of equal treatment. From a
utilitarian perspective, different outcomes to "equally culpable" offenders will diminish those out-
comes from deterring others in the future, since the "price" for committing the crime and getting
caught is left unclear, which in itself may cause it to be perceived as lower than its "real" value.
107. Luna, supra note 101, at 205.
108. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectiv-
ism: the Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2063, 2081
(2002). ("almost all modem criminologists acknowledge that each of the four traditional justifications
for punishment-retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation-must continue to play some
role in the criminal justice system"). See also Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resil-
ience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313
(2000) (demonstrating how retribution was restored as an essential purpose of punishment via judicial
activism.); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 413 (1999) (sug-
gesting that the use of utilitarian justifications for punishment-its "disembodied idiom of costs and
benefits"--allows society to avoid the underlying reasons for punishing offenders, which inherently
involve difficult moral and cultural debates).
109. Even though restorative processes are not aimed at bypassing traditional fact-finding processes
(and may very well be applied after the completion of the fact-finding phase of a criminal trial, for
example) they may have an effect on the fact-finding process as well. Restorative processes include a
discussion on the facts of the case and require concession of certain facts on the part of offenders. As a
result, facts different from or additional to those determined in a prior fact-finding process may emerge
and be included in the factual basis of the case.
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legitimacy of restorative justice through the theoretical and empirical breakdown
of the rehabilitative welfare model." 10
A. Restorative justice and retributivism
At first, it may seem as though the restorative paradigm of justice is in com-
plete contrast to the retributive philosophy. Both Kant and Hegel, the forefathers
of modem retribution, emphasize the injury to society as opposed to the harm
caused to the individual victim, as the basis for justifying punishment."' Hegel
proclaims that without focusing on the offense and the "injured universal," pun-
ishment would be nothing more than personal revenge."l 2 In other words, retribu-
tivism does not allow us to focus on the specific harm caused to a specific victim
as the basis for the public response to crime, and any impositions upon the of-
fender to restore that harm would be deemed unjustifiable. Moreover, the public
response to crime cannot be used to achieve additional goals other than punishing
offenders according to their "just deserts," if these goals alter in some way the
"deserved" punishment. In Kant's words:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead
it must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has
committed a crime ... the law concerning punishment is a categorical
imperative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths
of a theory of happiness looking for some advantage to be gained by re-
leasing the criminal from punishment or by reducing the amount of it."
3
It still remains to be asked what a typical "deserved" punishment it. The an-
swer according to the retributive philosophy is any punishment that "equals" the
crime, 114 but in essence, punishment is about the infliction of pain and depravation
upon the offender as "the only way justice can be restored.'15 Only by painful
sanctions can the public express its disapproval of the offender's conduct."
When comparing these principles to those of restorative justice, we find just
how far apart they seem to be. While restorative justice focuses on the individuals
involved in the criminal event-the victim, offender and close community, re-
tributivism emphasizes the violation of the offense and the threat to society in
general. While restorative justice focuses on changing future behavior and repair-
ing the harm, retributivism is interested in only two time frames: the past criminal
110. See Hoffman, supra note 108, at 2078-79.
111. See Hegel, supra note 99, at 140-4 1, §§ 218-20.
112. Id.
113. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100, (John Ladd trans., Macmil-
lan 1986) (1797).
114. See id. at 101-02 ("Inasmuch as someone steals, he makes the ownership of everyone else inse-
cure .... [H]e must let the state have his labor at any kind of work it may wish to use him for (convict
labor), and so he becomes a slave, either for a certain period of time or indefinitely, as the case may be.
If, however, he has committed a murder, he must die. In this case, there is no substitute that will satisfy
the requirement of legal justice.").
115. Brunk, supra note 30, at 38.
116. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS, 9-11 (1993).
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act and the deserved present punishment based on the past. Retributivism is not
interested in the future at all. While restorativists see the response to crime as an
opportunity to heal individuals and relationships, therefore believing punishment
should help achieve those goals, not infringe on them, retributivists see punish-
ment as the goal in itself. The mere concept of a victim-oriented process, not to
mention victim healing, is entirely foreign to a retributive criminal justice system.
But these concepts alone are not the only ones which are irrelevant to a retributive
theory of punishment. Concepts like reducing crime and enhancing the public's
perception of the justice system's fairness are equally irrelevant as well. Of
course, so long as the punishment "fits" and "equals" the crime, it may consist of
additional otherwise "foreign" virtues, but those are clearly secondary to the pri-
mary goal of "just deserts."
So how can retributivism and restorative justice go hand-in-hand despite
these fundamental differences? As will be shown, despite the practical differences
in outcome and approach, the two paradigms of justice can be (and are, in my
opinion) philosophically compatible. The first level of compatibility can be found
in the core premises of restorativism' 17 and retributivism. As Hegel clearly articu-
lates, punishment is not imposed on an offender by society, but by the offender
himself, who voluntarily chose to violate the law and face up to the consequences
of his actions." 8  Moreover, according to positive retributivists, the violation of
the law and the morally culpable behavior of the offender obligate the state to
punish that offender."l 9 In other words, the criminal offense can be seen as a "call
for action" that requires the state to punish the offender. This retributive premise
goes hand-in-hand with the restorative justice principle of offender accountabil-
ity.' 20 Here too, the criminal offense is a "call for action," but in addition to soci-
ety's obligation to respond to the crime and "annul" its moral repercussions, re-
storative justice turns to offenders as well and demands their accountability. In
this aspect, both restorative justice and retributivism are backward-looking, con-
necting past acts to present moral obligations. Restorative justice does not contra-
dict the abstract notion of the state's obligation. On the contrary, it casts this no-
tion with content and applies it to smaller, more intimate (and perhaps more mean-
ingful) societal entities such as the close community and the affected parties'
families. But it does not stop there. Just as retributivism sees the criminal event
as the basis for justifying the state's obligation, restorative justice sees it as the
basis for justifying the imposition of obligations upon the offender. As Howard
117. See Stephen P. Garvey, Restorative Justice, Punishment, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
303, 304 (using the term "restorativism" as a synonym for restorative justice).
118. HEGEL, supra note 99, at 70, §100 ("The [penalty] which falls on the criminal is not merely
implicitly just-as just, it is eo ipso his implicit will, an embodiment of his freedom, his right; on the
contrary, it is also a right established within the criminal himself, i.e. in his objectively embodied will,
in his action"). See also M.D. Dubber, Crime and Punishment: Rediscovering Hegel's Theory of
Crime and Punishment: Hegel's Political Philosophy: Interpreting the Practice of Legal Punishment,
92 MICH. L. REV. 1577, 1607-08 (1992) (explaining Hegel's theory of punishment of the rational
offender).
119. MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 91 (1997) ("Moral re-
sponsibility in such a view is not only necessary for justified punishment, it is also sufficient. Such
sufficiency of justification gives society more than merely a right to punish culpable offenders. It does
this, making it not unfair to punish them, but retributivism justifies more than this. For a retributivist,
the moral responsibility of an offender also gives society the duty to punish.")(emphasis added).
120. See ZEHR, supra note 16.
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Zehr phrased it: "When someone wrongs another, he or she has an obligation to
make things right. This is what justice should be about. It means encouraging
offenders to understand and acknowledge the harm they have done and then tak-
ing steps, even if incomplete or symbolic, to make that wrong right."'
' 21
This deep connection between the past criminal event and the rise of present
moral and practical obligations, on society, communities and offenders, is an im-
portant basic principle for both retributivism and restorativism. The main differ-
ence, however, is that while retributivism satisfies itself with the offender's obli-
gation to bear punishment, restorativism broadens that obligation to include posi-
tive steps to restore at least part of the physical harm caused by the offense. It
may be erroneously inferred from the comparison above that while retributivism
emphasizes the importance of annulling the crime and restoring justice through
punishment and infliction of pain, restorative justice emphasizes repairing the
harm and seeks out alternatives to avoid punishment. This conclusion is incorrect
on two levels: first, in contrasting "restoring justice" with "repairing the harm;"
second, in the automatic association of retributivism with punishment and restora-
tivism with the avoidance thereof.
On the first level, we must examine the relationship between the retributive
restoration of justice and the restorative reparation of the harm. According to
George Fletcher, a prominent advocate for the retributive paradigm, including the
suffering of victims as part of the theory of retributive punishment can only enrich
that theory, not negate it. Fletcher recognizes the "particular relationship" estab-
lished between the offender and victim in the criminal act, giving the offender "a
form of dominance that continues after the crime has supposedly occurred."' 22 It
is that dominance that offers us another level of justification for arrest, trial and
punishment of offenders-the attempt to restore the position and dignity of vic-
tims. 123 In other words, the acknowledgment of victims' perspectives does not
only, in itself, contradict retribution, but actually strengthens the theoretical foun-
dations of retribution and deepens its justification. Restorative justice takes this
notion one step further. If retributive justice seeks "equality between offender and
victim by subjecting the offender to punishment and communicating to the victim
a concern for his or her antecedent suffering, ' 24 why shouldn't the deserved pun-
ishment include components that acknowledge that suffering and strive to restore
the equality between the parties? Retributivism does not reject a priori other in-
herent attributes of a punishment, so long as that punishment is the offender's
"just deserts." The meaning of this is that the retributive "restoration of justice"
may very well include the restorative "reparation of the harm."
The question still remains, how does restorative justice deal with the other
components of a retributive "deserved" punishment, those embedded in the Kant-
ian "eye for an eye" ideal? 125 In order to better answer this question, inherent in
the second level of analysis described above, I will rephrase it as two separate
questions: (1) Does retribution mandate pain and suffering as part of punishment?
(2) Does restorative justice really reject the concept of punishment?
121. Id.
122. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 57-58.
123. Id. at 58.
124. Id.
125. See KANT, supra note 113.
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In order to answer these questions, we must better understand the different
meanings given to the concept of punishment. These different meanings can be
placed on an axis, starting from the most restricting definitions, on the far left,
which include only a very limited number of responses which are considered pun-
ishment, and ending with the right side of the axis which contains broader defini-
tions. For example, some theorists regard the intention of imposing pain on of-
fenders, whether through incarceration or fines, as determinative. To them, the
lack of such intention inherently negates punishment. Therefore, sentencing an
offender to rehabilitation or compensation of the victim would be considered as
the use of constructive, non-punitive measures. 26 These theorists would probably
be located closer to the left end of the axis. A broader approach, closer to the
right end of the axis, contends that punishment should be considered as any un-
pleasant burden imposed on the offender. This would obviously include paying a
fine, but most probably would also include compensating the victim, performing
community service and even attending a counseling program-all typical out-
comes of restorative practices. 27 Moreover, following this broad definition of
punishment, it may be argued that the mere participation of the offender in a re-
storative process, which entails having to confront an angry victim and in many
cases family and community members as well, listening to their concerns and
answering their questions, is an extremely difficult and unpleasant experience, and
as such may be considered part of the punishment.
According to the latter definition, the gap between retributivism and restora-
tivism is minimized, and the answer to the second question posed above emerges.
Following the broad definition of punishment leads to the conclusion that restora-
tive justice does not reject the concept of punishment nor does it attempt to avoid
it as a matter of principle. Rather, by offering a new model of justice it encour-
ages us to think about punishment in new innovative ways. By relying so heavily
on incarceration and fines, the criminal justice system elevated these specific
technical forms of punishment to the level of punishment paradigms, in effect
stopping us from looking for other ways of punishing and automatically associat-
ing the concept of punishment with these mechanisms. Therefore, as R.A. Duff
suggests, restorative justice should not be seen as implementing alternatives to
punishment but rather as enriching the criminal justice system with alternative
forms of punishment. 128 This suggested understanding of restorativism is begin-
ning to gain support among scholars and proponents of restorative justice due to
its theoretical and practical importance.129 Its theoretical importance is in the
justification it provides for putting offenders through restorative processes and
126. See Kathleen Daly, Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 39 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds.,
2000).
127. See id. at 39-40.
128. R.A. Duff, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 92-99 (2001).
129. See Daly, supra note 126 (explicitly endorsing this understanding). See also Paul H. Robinson,
The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375 (while
stating the advantages of restorative processes, Robinson argues that restorative justice cannot do
without punishment and cannot substitute the criminal justice system. Not only does Robinson attack
the disassociation of punishment and restorative justice, but he ends the article by suggesting to in-
crease "the punishment available to restorative processes," and to see them as "punishment units" that
are granted the discretion to determine the method of punishment in addition to its amount).
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their outcomes. Its practical importance is in the indispensable contribution it
makes to the restorative process. Since the participants in these processes are
members of the general society, and share the same beliefs and perceptions com-
mon to the general society, it is imperative that restorative practices acknowledge
these perceptions and implement them. These common notions include the strong
association of censure and public condemnation associated with the concept of
punishment. As Andrew von Hirsch clearly articulated, it is by the infliction of
unpleasant and burdening sanctions that society can express its disapproval of the
offender's actions.' 30 It is this explicit condemnation of the act (not the actor) that
grants victims the legitimacy to feel angry and resentful toward offenders at first,
while subsequently allowing them to repair the harm to the extent they can.13' In
return, it is this unequivocal censure that enables offenders to undergo a learning
experience which stresses the different levels of their wrongdoing and the actual
consequences of their actions. This learning experience can be seriously impeded
if the message sent to offenders condones their conduct. What follows is that the
absence of punishment in restorative processes may actually impede the achieve-
ment of the most important objectives of these processes, and therefore punish-
ment in its broad sense should be seen as an indispensable aspect of restorative
justice.
Although restorative justice does not reject the concept of punishment, but
rather contains alternative forms of punishment, it still remains to analyze the
relationship between these alternatives and retributivism. Do retributive punish-
ments necessarily demand inflicting the maximum amount of pain and suffering
possible, as their end goal, or can they condone alternative punishments that em-
phasize other qualities in addition to the imposition of unpleasant burdens? Retri-
bution is not-and should not-be limited solely to the infliction of pain and suf-
fering upon offenders. It can, and should, be seen to demand a "deserved" pun-
ishment for guilty offenders, but it does not necessarily equate that punishment
with the infliction of the most painful sanction allowed under the specific circum-
stances. In the words of Robinson and Darley:
While the amount of punishment to be imposed must match the amount
required by community perceptions of desert, the method of inflicting
that punishment is generally irrelevant to the goal of desert.
[T]he judge need only take account of the "punishment bite" of each
sanctioning method used and ensure that the total "bite" of all sanctions
add up to the amount deserved, not noticeably more or less ... [W]e have
recently published research on public perceptions of the punitive bite of
alternative sanctioning methods .... It shows that non-incarcerative sen-
130. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 10-11 (1993). See also Kahan, Alternative
Sanctions, supra note 102, at 598 n.27 (citing a number of leading scholars, such as Jean Hampton and
Robert Nozick, expressing the significance of punishment as moral condemnation).
131. See Daly, supra note 126, at41.
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tences frequently can be used to inflict the punishment deserved, even for
many non-minor offenses."
'1 32
This conclusion is also consistent with the broader definition of punishment
presented above, which better achieves von Hirsch's primary purpose for punish-
ment-the expression of censure. If according to "the leading modem advocate of
retribution" 13 punishment is meant to convey a message, it ought to have at its
disposal as many tools as possible in order to fulfill its purpose. Limiting retribu-
tive punishments to incarcerations and fines puts the retributive ideal of giving
offenders their "just deserts" at risk. Who said offenders necessarily deserve to be
incarcerated for their wrongdoing? Why shouldn't they deserve to be confronted
by their victims and families and to be obligated to take action in repairing what
they have harmed? Limiting our scope of punishment and associating punishment
with incarceration and fines is the product of overusing these specific techniques
for a very long period of time, not the product of a deep philosophy mandating
these forms of punishment and precluding others.134
Incarceration and fines have become western society's "hammer," the only
tool used to fix our problems, which unsurprisingly will all "look like nails."',
35
There is no contradiction to retributivism in viewing "desert" in ways other than
"nails" and using innovative tools that are not all "hammers." Moreover, by in-
cluding restorative processes within the framework of the punishments available
to the criminal justice system, we can achieve a more complete retributive re-
sponse to crime. In thinking about the Hegelian "annulment" of the crime,' 36 we
think of punishment as a way of fixing the moral right violated by the criminal act.
However, crime violates not only the abstract moral right, but also the dignity of
specific victims, by the "wrongdoer's message of superiority"' 37 over them. If we
are serious about the "annulment" of crime, we should not disregard this latter
personal violation and hold offenders accountable for this aspect of their wrong-
doing as well. Jean Hampton expressed this notion:
[T]he demand for a wrongdoer to "make amends" to his victim is a re-
tributive idea, arising from the retributive claim that repairing diminish-
ment requires, among other things, repairing the wrongdoer's damage to
132. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 491 (1997).
133. See Luna, supra note 107, at 218.
134. See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 102. Kahan argues that alternative sanctions are
rejected by the public because they do not express condemnation "as dramatically and unequivocally"
as imprisonment Id. at 592. Although this argument presents a theoretical explanation supporting the
use of incarceration, Kahan does not proceed to claim that the necessary condemnation cannot be
achieved by the use of other punitive measures. Id. He does, however, argue that for any alternative to
be publicly acceptable they must be combined with "shaming penalties" or "impose shame them-
selves." Id at 594. Interestingly, Kahan's conclusion consists of similar elements as delineated in the
"Reintegrative Shaming Theory" developed by one of the world's leading authorities on restorative
justice, John Braithwaite. BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 74.
135. Sir Charles Pollard stated, "If your only tool is a hammer, all your problems will look like nails."
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 165 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2001).
136. HEGEL, supra note 99 at 71, § 101.
137. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1659, 1698 (1992).
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the victim's entitlements (generated by her value). A punishment can
have built into it actions or services that constitute such amends.'
38
Therefore, using restorative processes as complementary alternatives to the
current criminal justice system does not negate retributive justifications for pun-
ishment. Furthermore, they offer the possibility of deepening the retributive re-
sponse to the criminal act by adding a new dimension to the "annulment" of crime
and the "restoration" of justice. 139
B. Restorative justice and utilitarianism
While retributivism is a strictly backward-looking justification of punishment,
delineating a strong connection between moral culpability and the violated norm,
the utilitarian theory offers the exact opposite. First and foremost, it is forward-
looking, entirely rejecting punishments that cannot achieve "the general object
which all laws have ... to augment the total happiness of the community ... to
exclude some greater evil."'14 In other words, a utilitarian punishment must serve
some other desired objective-the increase of the aggregated common good.
Utilitarianists are not concerned at all with the offender's past behavior as a basis
for punishment, since "all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is
evil.'' a4 They view punishment as a means, not an end, which is the only way in
which the infliction of punishment may be justified.
But there is a deeper purpose in changing the perspective from backward-
looking to forward-looking; by doing so, utilitarianism can make two important
distinctions that illuminate the philosophical basis for punishment in a different
light: the first differentiates between legal and moral obligations; the second
makes a clear distinction between the offense and the offender. By leaving the
offense in the past and concentrating on the future, utilitarianists free themselves
from dealing with the difficult link between law and morality. A retributive pun-
ishment is justified (and even mandated) due to the offender's moral wrongdoing
and the need to restore the "moral right."'142 But to utilitarianists, the law is not
about morality. It is about defending "the public liberty"'143 and protecting society
138. Id. at 1697.
139. See Garvey, supra note 117. Garvey suggests that whereas retributivism answers the morally
"wrong" in the criminal offense, restorativism answers only to the physical "harm" caused by it. Id. at
308. Using this distinction, Garvey argues that the only way to answer wrongdoing is by retributive
punishment, as opposed to atonement, achieved by restorative processes. Id. While Garvey's distinc-
tions are important and relevant, I believe he has misapplied them to restorative justice by viewing the
restoration of the harm caused to crime victims as the primary objective of restorative processes.
Admittedly, while restoring this harm is an important goal in restorative justice, it is, to my under-
standing, not the most important one and it does not predominate other important objectives these
processes consist of. What follows is that restorative justice is not aimed primarily at restoring
"harms," and therefore may be considered as addressing "wrongs" as well.
140. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158
(J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart eds., 1982) (1783).
141. Id.
142. HEGEL, supra note 99.
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from offenders.44 Therefore, it should only be used to the extent it promotes the
public welfare. Moral wrongdoing has nothing to do with what utilitarian pun-
ishment is about. As a result of this first distinction, a second one becomes possi-
ble: one that differentiates between the physical conduct that violated the law and
the individual who committed the offense. Since utilitarian punishment does not
imply moral wrongdoing, its infliction does not promulgate the offender as a mor-
ally wicked person. All it means is that the offender broke the law. 145 This dis-
tinction dictates that "punishment should fit the offender and not the offense,"'
46
hence changing dramatically the retributive calculation of a "just" (or appropriate)
punishment for the offense committed and broadening the types of sanctions and
punishment mechanisms that can be imposed on convicted offenders by the crimi-
nal justice system.
When it comes to these principles, it seems as though restorative justice and
utilitarianism are in agreement. Although the former is backward-looking in that
it emphasizes the role of the offense as the moral basis for the offender's obliga-
tions toward the victim and community, it does not neglect the utilitarian aspects
of punishment. Just like utilitarianism, restorative justice does not accept the in-
fliction of sanctions on offenders merely because they "deserve" them. Rather, it
accepts the premise that past wrongdoing creates future obligations, but it de-
mands that these obligations are not seen as the primary objectives in themselves.
At this point, restorative justice becomes forward-looking, as dictated by utilitar-
ian justifications of punishment. In other words, if we are going to punish because
offenders "deserve" to be punished (since they have obligations to make things
right), we might as well impose sanctions that aspire to achieve other noble goals,
namely reducing crime and increasing public welfare. For this reason, restorative
justice accepts the two distinctions mentioned above, between moral wrongdoing
and committing a criminal offense and between the physical act and the actor. It
is these distinctions that enable the restorative process to maintain offenders' rein-
tegration back into their communities as one of its primary goals, since offenders
are not perceived as morally "bad" people that should be alienated from society
but rather as people who committed a "bad" act.
The most distinctive utilitarian goals to be achieved by criminal sanctioning
are: general deterrence (deterring others from committing crimes at all and reduc-
ing the severity of the crimes that are committed) 14 7 and specific deterrence (deter-
ring the particular offender from re-offending in the future). Deterrence of the
general public is assumed to be accomplished by using a particular offender's
punishment as a warning and example to other potential offenders. Specific deter-
rence is based on the assumption that the offender is a rational person who will
abstain from committing a criminal act if and when its costs outweigh the benefits,
144. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1195 (1985).
145. Wesley Cragg, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THEORY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
33(1992).
146. Id. at 35.
147. See BENTHAM, supra note 140, at 165 ("His first, most extensive, and most eligible object, is to
prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offenses whatsoever: in other words, so
to manage, that no offense whatsoever may be committed. But if a man must commit an offense ...
the next object is to induce him to commit an offense less mischievous, rather than one more mischie-
vous, of two offenses that.., suit his purpose").
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i.e. the painful consequences of the offense are not worth the anticipated gain it
will provide the offender. 48 These goals, especially the second one, prescribe the
use of incapacitation and rehabilitation (disabling the offender from reoffending,
namely through incarceration, and "curing" the "illness" that caused the offender
to commit the offense, respectively) as the main utilitarian mechanisms employed
in increasing public safety and welfare.
According to the utilitarian theory of punishment, there should be no diffi-
culty in employing restorative processes in response to crime, so long as they can
provide public and specific deterrence which are at least equal to the criminal
justice system. Since punishment is a "utility" for the achievement of other objec-
tives, and not the goal in itself, the type of mechanism used should be determined
by empirical data. The process of choice would be whichever process delivers the
best results in the specific case. The problem, however, is that this kind of data,
especially the long term effects of any new process employed, is extremely diffi-
cult (and often quite impossible) to obtain. If the only test is an empirical one, and
the necessary data is unavailable, how can the use of restorative processes ever be
justified?
One immediate answer to this question is that most of the recidivism studies
that compared re-offense rates of offenders who participated in restorative prac-
tices with those sentenced by the court found substantial differences in favor of
the restorative processes. 149 However, this answer may be deemed insufficient
since it does not account for the studies, few as they may be, that point to the op-
posite and show an increase in recidivism rates for offenders who participated in
restorative processes. If anything, these studies indicate that certain types of re-
storative processes are ineffective or that certain types of participants or facilita-
tors are unsuitable for these processes, questioning the legitimacy of even experi-
menting with potentially ineffective processes when other somewhat effective
alternatives exist. Since questions of legitimacy should not be taken lightly and
restorative processes cannot be treated as a panacea, since their success, as in the
case of other processes, depend on the personality and capabilities of their opera-
tors and participants, 15 other justifications for the use of restorative processes
must be provided.
A different approach to the lack of empirical evidence supporting the utility
of restorative practices can be provided by comprehensive theories that explain
why these processes ought to succeed in reducing crime. The main advantage in
turning to the theoretical sphere is that it can respond to those studies that portray
restorative justice as failing to meet utilitarian standards and provide a systematic
approach to the analysis of restorative justice's legitimacy. Turning to the theo-
148. Bush, supra note 9, at 442-51 (summarizing the fundamental concepts of rationality, deterrence
and compensation in the law and economics theory in the context of criminal law).
149. See supra notes 64-70 (regarding the effectiveness of restorative practices).
150. Even in the criminal justice system, which provides a supposedly "catch-all" process, not only
does the outcome of a trial depend greatly on the competence of the judge and lawyers but also on the
relationship between the prosecutor and defense lawyer or the relationship between the defense lawyer
and the client. These relationships may determine whether or not there will be a plea-bargain, and if
there is a plea-bargain, may influence the terms of the agreement. These relationships may determine
the amount of information offenders decide to share with their lawyers, and their personalities will
dictate whether they appear remorseful at sentencing, whether they decide to speak in court and the
content of their words. All of these factors directly impact the final outcome of a criminal trial.
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retical level can also help strengthen the empirical justification for restorative
practices where other studies, conducted in other areas, can be shown to be suffi-
ciently relevant to these practices. Therefore, if it were possible to provide an
established, substantially related theory that proves restorative justice "works,"
restorative practices could be given a go-ahead without negating a utilitarian the-
ory of punishment. John Braithwaite suggests five theories that, in his opinion, do
just that-offer explanations for "why restorative justice processes might be effec-
tive in reducing crime and accomplishing other kinds of restoration."' 51
One of the theories suggested is Braithwaite's Reintegrative Shaming Theory,
which emphasizes the disapproval of the act while refraining from negatively
stigmatizing and humiliating the offender. 152 Interestingly, this theory would not
be able to arise in the absence of the utilitarian distinction between the offense
(the act) and the offender (the person). It is this important distinction that enables
parents to discipline their children in a way that demonstrates unequivocal disap-
proval of the child's misconduct, while at the same time reinforcing their love and
respect for the child. The literature in this area shows that children of parents that
employed this kind of disciplining, as opposed to "laissez-faire parenting" or
"punitively authoritarian parenting," are less likely to be delinquents.' 53 The the-
ory of Reintegrative Shaming was tested when applied to the inspection of Austra-
lian nursing homes compliance with the law between 1993 and 1996. The study
found that nursing homes inspected by stigmatizing or understanding inspectors
suffered a reduction in compliance, while those checked by inspectors with a "Re-
integrative Shaming philosophy" demonstrated improved compliance with the
law.154 There are many correlations between the Reintegrative Shaming Theory
and restorative practices. For one, they take place in a supportive environment for
both the victim and the offender. In family group conferencing and community
conferencing the support given to offenders is significantly strengthened through
the attendance of family and friends, those respected by the offenders. Conse-
quently, the shaming, inherent to the discussion of the consequences of the crime
(a discussion imperative to every restorative practice model), is structured and
channeled to avoid unproductive stigmatization; the message sent to the offender
clearly shows disapproval of the misconduct, but does not demand that the of-
fender be cast out of the community. The presence of support people for the of-
fender reiterates that message. Based on the empirical merits of the Reintegrative
Shaming Theory, it may be inferred that restorative justice is potentially more
effective in reducing crime than the current system.
Another theory offered by Braithwaite as' an explanation of why restorative
justice works is the Procedural Justice Theory. Studies found that citizens were
more likely to obey the law when they felt they were treated fairly by the justice
system.155 As demonstrated in Part II above, restorative processes persistently
151. BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 73. The theories suggested by the
author are: the Reintegrative Shaming Theory, the Procedural Justice Theory, the Theory of Unac-
knowledged Shame, the Defiance Theory and the Self-Categorization Theory. Id. In this article, I will
touch upon the first three theories.
152. Id. at 74.
153. BRAITHWArrE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54-68 (1989) [hereinafter BRArrHWArrE,
CRIME]; BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 74.
154. Id. at 77.
155. Id. at 78.
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receive higher evaluations than the courts when it comes to participants' percep-
tion of fairness of the process they underwent. Since evidence shows that the
fairer the proceedings are perceived to be the better they are at attaining compli-
ance with the law, it may be concluded that restorative processes are more effec-
tive in reducing crime than the current system.
A third theory mentioned by Braithwaite is the Theory of Unacknowledged
Shame, which emphasizes the productive role of shame and the acknowledgment
of that shame in encouraging normative behavior (rather than merely focusing on
the ways of expressing condemnation of the act, as in the Reintegrative Shaming
Theory). Evidence seems to support the argument that "unacknowledged shame
contributes to violence."' 56  Restorative processes encourage offenders to take
responsibility for their actions and induce apologies--one of the most obvious and
natural ways people acknowledge the shame they feel-in a vastly higher number
of incidents compared to those resolved by the courts, 57 therefore contributing to
the conclusion that the former processes are better at reducing violence and en-
hancing society's welfare than the latter.
These three mentioned theories in conjunction with the numerous studies that
demonstrate a reduction in recidivism rates for participants of restorative practices
provide a sufficient empirical showing of these processes' ability to deter. The
problem is, however, that their relevancy is narrowed to only one of the utilitarian
goals-specific deterrence. They do not tell us anything about restorative prac-
tices' ability to deter other potential offenders, their capability to provide an
equally important utilitarian goal-adequate general deterrence. Moreover, logic
dictates that these processes would have a negative effect in deterring the public,
since they are perceived as more lenient than the formal criminal justice system,
hence lowering the "price" for criminal conduct and making it more attractive to
potential offenders. Additionally, in order for any specific punishment to serve as
a public deterrent it must be publicized. Sentences imposed on offenders by the
courts attain the necessary publicity by the very fact that they are given in open
court, by their publication in official court reports and by the attention they re-
ceive in the mass media. 5 8 Typically, restorative sanctions do not receive such
exposure. They are reached in a closed and private setting, are often not docu-
mented in any official publicly accessible report and rarely attract any media at-
156. Id. at 81.
157. Poulson, supra note 92, at 189 ("offenders were 6.9 times more likely to apologize to the victim
in restorative justice settings than in court. To put this difference into perspective, very nearly three
out of four (74%) offenders in restorative justice apologized, whereas almost three out of four (71%)
offenders in court did not apologize").
158. For example, in December 2004 in the United States it was widely known that Scott Peterson, a
young fertilizer salesman from California, was found guilty of murdering his wife and unborn child,
and was sentenced to death. See Rusty Domin, CNN, Jury Recommends Death for Peterson,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/12/13/peterson.case (last visited November 13, 2005). But at the
same time, hardly anyone knows about meetings conducted between inmates and ex-convicts who
were convicted of serious violent crimes and their victims as part of the RSVP program operated by
the San Francisco Sheriffs Department. See San Francisco Sheriffs Department Homepage, RSVP:
Resolve to Stop the Violence Project, http://www.sfgov.org/site/sheriffjindex.asp?id=25413 (last
visited November 13, 2005). See also Dolores Fox Ciardelli, Face to Face, PLEASONTON WEEKLY,
November 14, 2003, http://www.pleasantonweekly.com/morgue/2003/2003-l14.justicel4.html.
(discussing the meeting between Sue Solis and a hit-man, hired to murder her but successful only at
wounding her after shooting her in the stomach, 12 years previously).
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tention. If they do not even know about these sanctions, how can potential of-
fenders ever be deterred?
The answer is that restorative sanctions provide for a different type of general
deterrence. As explained previously, the conventional, Benthamian deterrence is
based on the intimidation of future potential offenders by using individual pun-
ishment as a demonstration of the outcome offenders must account for when en-
gaging in wrongful conduct.159 Unfortunately, this classic type of deterrence has
been empirically shown to have a very modest effect in preventing crime, mainly
because studies show that potential offenders are less interested in the harshness
of the punishment they may face but are more concerned with the probability of
actually having to face that punishment (which in most cases is not very high).' 6 °
Although I do not wish to defend or criticize the utilitarian theory of punish-
ment in this article, I bring forth this critique only to set the grounds for a new
understanding of the term "deterrence," which utilitarianists should agree is more
effective than the classic understanding of general deterrence. Since a utilitarian
theory of punishment justifies sanctioning only when it can "exclude some greater
evil,"' 16 1 i.e. prevent crime, it must consider the elements that cause people to obey
the law. Robinson and Darley identify two elements as empirically proven to be
most dominant: according to the first, people fear the disapproval of their social
group for violating the law; the second states that people generally perceive them-
selves as moral human beings who try to conduct themselves accordingly.162 In
other words, there are two mechanisms that induce us to comply with the law, one
external and the other internal. The external mechanism is based on the social
sanctions one experiences when deviating from the normative behavior expected
from a member of a particular social group. These sanctions, which are not re-
stricted merely to criminal wrongdoing, may consist of neighbors' frowning faces
in the local grocery store, social isolation, loss of trust or even loss of a job. The
159. BENTHAM, supra note 101, at 158 ("The immediate principal end of punishment is to control
action. This action is either that of the offender, or of others . . . that of others it can influence no
otherwise than by its influence over their wills; in which case it is said to operate in the way of exam-
ple.").
160. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 132, at 458-64, nn.12-22 (citing studies that demonstrate the
low risk of getting caught, convicted and imprisoned after committing serious offenses; they also cite
studies that demonstrate the low deterrent effect of imprisonment and the uselessness of lengthy prison
terms. The authors conclude this part arguing that taking into account the studies above, it would
require ridiculous periods of imprisonment, which the community could never accept, to truly deter
potential offenders). See Bush, supra note 9, at 454-57 (discussing whether, from a law and economics
perspective, the criminal justice system deters crime. He finds in conclusion a "marginal deterrence
value to prison," but determines that the benefits of "long-term incarceration will be outweighed by the
costs under any analysis, given that it serves no deterrence purpose, increases societal costs, and leaves
offenders who might otherwise be productive members of society without that ability"). See Dan
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349,361 (1997) [hereinafter
Kahan, Social Influence] (describing how despite the heavy reliance on imprisonment during the
1980s, crime rates steadily continued to increase). See also BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE,
supra note 28, at 102, 108 (demonstrating the failure of deterrence as a policy and outlining the "deter-
rence trap," leading to the conclusion articulated by Robinson and Darley above).
161. BENTHAM, supra note 140, at 158.
162. Robinson & Darley, supra note 132, at 468-70 (citing scholars and researchers that emphasize
the dominant role of "informal forces of social control" and "interpersonal influence" in inducing
compliance with the law, over legal sanctioning). See also Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 160, at
357 (citing studies that show that "most people refrain from engaging in crime not because they fear
formal penalties but because they fear damage to their reputation and loss of status").
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internal mechanism is the product of the moral rules one adapts while growing up
and the sense of obligation to uphold these moral rules.' 63 There is, of course, an
unavoidable connection between the two mechanisms, since we tend to internalize
the social norms dictated by our cultural environment. Eventually "people come
to hold the moral standards of the cultures in which they are raised; internal moral
standards and external norms generally label the same actions right or wrong.
''64
Dan Kahan identifies a third empirically supported reason for people's willingness
to obey various laws. According to Kahan, people tend to obey those laws they
believe others, whom they respect, view as worthy of obedience. In Kahan's
words: "If compliance is perceived to be widespread, persons generally desire to
obey; but if they believe that disobedience is rampant, their commitment to fol-
lowing the law diminishes."' 65 Restorative processes emphasize these three ele-
ments and enable them to fully affect not only the offender, but all other partici-
pants as well. It is this latter aspect of restorative practices that provides the de-
sired utilitarian general deterrence.
However, in the context of restorative practices general deterrence takes on a
different meaning. According to GUnther Jakobs, a German theorist, general de-
terrence can be achieved by strengthening and supporting the basic norms prohib-
iting criminal conduct as opposed to using intimidation and threat of inflicting
pain in cases of non-compliance. I find this new understanding of general deter-
rence, coined by Jakobs as "positive general deterrence,',' 66 extremely appropriate
to the analysis here, providing restorative practices with a strictly utilitarian justi-
fication of punishment. As mentioned above, the internal aspiration to do the
morally right thing, fear of the community's disapproval and the belief that the
community values such compliance are among the most dominant elements of
compliance with the law. This is precisely how positive general deterrence works.
After a criminal act has been committed, the community must express its disap-
proval of the conduct. 167 By doing so, it reiterates the value of complying with the
law in general and reemphasizes the importance of the specific norm that was
violated by the criminal act. It also strengthens the community's consensus
around acts that constitute wrongdoing in the eyes of the community, not only in
the eyes of the law, and induces the offender to internalize these norms. However,
as with "negative general deterrence,"' 168 the primary means used to convey this
163. Robinson & Darley, supra note 132, at 469.
164. Id. at 469-70. See also Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 160, at 358-59 ("individuals tend to
adapt their moral convictions to those of their peers").
165. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 102, at 604. See also Kahan, Social Influence, supra
note 160, at 350-51 (describing and explaining the dominant roles of "social influence" and "social
meaning" in crime prevention. According to Kahan, these terms refer to the way "individuals' percep-
tions of each others' values, beliefs, and behavior affect their conduct, including their decisions to
engage in crime," and the way in which "the law creates and shapes information about the kinds of
behavior that members of the public hope for and value, as well as the kinds they expect and fear,"
respectively).
166. See Manuel C. MeliA, Victim Behavior and Offender Liability: A European Perspective, 7 BUFF.
CRiM. L. REV. 513,514 n.5 (2005); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 54.
167. In the traditional criminal justice system, the prosecutor represents the community, and the court
promulgates the publicly expressed condemnation of the offender's act.
168. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 54 (describing the classic understanding of general deterrence).
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message is by penal sanctioning. 169 It is through punishment that positive general
deterrence is achieved. But as with retributivism, a broader definition of punish-
ment may be introduced, thus including any unpleasant burden imposed on the
offender, 70 with one main caveat; in the words of Bentham, it must "answer the
purpose of a moral lesson" and "inspire the public with sentiments of aversion
towards those pernicious habits and dispositions with which the offense appears to
be connected."' 7' With this broad understanding of the concept of punishment, it
is now possible to turn back to restorative practices and examine their ability to
achieve positive general deterrence.
Community and family-group conferences and circles'72 are among the com-
monly practiced restorative processes in the United States and many other Eng-
lish-speaking countries. The most distinct commonality of these processes is the
inclusion of a wide number of participants, mainly as community representatives.
Due to the centrality of the restorative justice premise that criminal acts are wrong
and therefore give rise to certain obligations on the part of the wrongdoer, offend-
ers in restorative conferences or circles will find themselves facing their families,
neighbors and community members as they express their disapproval of the crimi-
nal conduct and expect offenders to live up to their obligations. By doing so, not
only defendants experience the unequivocal condemnation of their acts, but each
and every participant experiences it. All participants, whether they are victims,
support people or community members, form a social group that reiterates the
importance of abiding by the law. Then, they all take an active part in forming the
restitution agreement, which transforms the abstract disapproval of the conduct
into practical obligations the offender must perform in order to right the wrong.
Requiring that offenders agree to their restorative punishments induces them, at
least in part, to internalize and recognize their wrongdoing. By providing people
close to and respected by the offenders with the opportunity to clarify their nega-
tive view of the offense, and by allowing the community and the offender to agree
on an appropriate punishment, restorative justice is able to give full effect to the
most dominant elements in inducing compliance with the law. It is in this way
that restorative processes can achieve, quite literally, positive general deterrence.
Interestingly, it may be argued that by empowering communities to deal with
criminal conduct that affects their members, society as a whole will enjoy an im-
provement in the conventional understanding of (negative) general deterrence as
well. As mentioned above, one of the main practical problems utilitarianists face
is that the low probability of detection precludes the full deterrent effect of pun-
169. Gunther Jakobs, Imputation in Criminal Law and the Conditions for Norm Validity, 7 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 491,495 (2004) ([A sanctions is] "a response to an act, which should be conceived of as
a protest against the validity of the norm, i.e. against the configuration of society. This response does
not pursue an indirect confirmation of the societal context, but is the direct confirmation itself. When
society sanctions, it refuses to think about modifying its configuration-that is, to think about a crimi-
nal act as an evolutionary act, as a possible option. Rather, society insists against this proposal to
change by remaining in the status quo.").
170. See Daly, supra note 126, at 39-40.
171. BENTHAM, supra note 140, at 171.
172. See Latimer and Kleinknecht, supra note 48, at § 2.3. See Barry Stuart, Guiding Principles for
Peacemaking Circles, RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING
COMMUNITIES 219 (Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff eds., 2001) (providing an introductory explana-
tion of circle processes).
[Vol. 2
40
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2005, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2005/iss2/4
Justifying Restorative Justice
ishment, thus undermining its utility.173 In other words, raising the chances an
offender will eventually get caught will immediately increase the deterrent effect
of punishment. Moreover, empirical studies show that even when the severity of
punishments imposed on the caught and convicted offenders is diminished, crime
rates are reduced where there is a high certainty of punishment. 174 It is in this
aspect that restorative justice can help rehabilitate negative general deterrence.
Evidence shows that communities and families know about far more wrongdoing
than do the police. 175 Reality dictates that most of these known crimes are simply
never reported to the authorities for a variety of reasons. 176 Restorative justice can
provide communities with the incentive to take action and not remain silent, since
they maintain a relatively high level of control over the process and its outcome.
In the words of Braithwaite: "When the community knows about many crimes
and reacts restoratively, the benefits of restoration motivate others to speak up,
increasing community members' knowledge of crimes they will want to do some-
thing about."' 177 If the police know of more crimes, the probability of detection,
conviction and punishment increase accordingly. In addition, communities might
even attempt to prevent the known offenders from reoffending themselves, using
some of the informal sanctions mentioned above or any other innovative means
they find appropriate, if and when they feel it is in their interest to do so. By em-
powering communities the way restorative justice does, communities may find it
is not only in their interest to report more crimes to law enforcement authorities,
but to try and prevent them as well. 178 Although this argument is yet to be empiri-
cally tested, it may turn out that restorative practices are better at incapacitating
173. See Bush, supra note 9, at 464 (defining deterrence as a "means some punishment adjustment to
the expected cost of committing a crime above and beyond the probability of being caught multiplied
by the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains").
174. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 160, at 379-80 (citing empirical evidence supporting the
assertion that high-certainty/low-severity strategies are more likely to achieve low crime r4tes).
175. BRArrWArrE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 117 (citing studies that empirically
support this argument). See Brief for the Chicago Neighborhood Organizations as Amicus Curiae
supporting Petitioner, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1998) (Dan Kahan and Michele
Odorizzi, acting as counsel for Amici Curiae, provide evidence that emphasizes the relationship be-
tween street gang members and the local community, as well as the knowledge held by gang-ridden
neighborhood residents as to the operation methods and whereabouts of street gang members).
176. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 160, at 380-81 (providing researched reasons for law
abiding citizens to refrain from cooperating with law enforcement authorities; reasons such as family
connections to the law-breakers, fear of retaliation on the part of offenders who were reported to the
authorities, or even the perception that severe punishments of members of minority groups expresses
contempt for the entire race or class).
177. BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 121.
178. The main difficulty with this argument is its complete reliance on the existence of a community.
As mentioned above, there are no guarantees that offenders will even have a community to influence
them in urban 21 st century life. Moreover, this argument does not seem to take into account communi-
ties that exist but do the exact opposite, inducing their members to commit crimes. Although this issue
deserves a broad and thorough analysis, such a discussion would exceed the scope of this article. The
short answer, however, is that restorative justice processes can (and do) create ad hoc communities of
care based on neighbors, friends or families, when a "conventional" community is not available.
Braithwaite cites a study showing that "homeless youth in Toronto and Vancouver were far from
alone." BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 142. It is these relationships that turn
into supportive communities of care through restorative processes.
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potential offenders (a prominent utilitarian goal) than the primary incapacitation
mechanism-imprisonment. 
7 9
In concluding this last point, it may be argued that restorative practices can
have a ripple effect enlarging the number of crimes that would otherwise go unde-
tected, increasing the community's motivation to report them and respond ade-
quately, and even inducing communities to attempt to prevent future offending by
the potentially dangerous. As a result, the criminal justice system will increase its
negative general deterrence effect in addition to the positive general deterrence
restorative practices are well designed to achieve.
C. Restorative justice and the rehabilitative ideal
Unlike modem retributivism and utilitarianism, which have their philosophi-
cal roots in the late 18th and early 1 9 th centuries and are still extremely relevant to
sentencing policies nowadays, the rehabilitative approach to punishment became
dominant only in the early part of the 20 th century, but was abandoned after being
regarded a complete failure by the 1970s. 180 Nevertheless, rehabilitation is still
considered to be one of the goals of the criminal justice system, even if not among
the primary ones, and in many ways is enjoying a certain revival through the in-
creasingly growing phenomenon of "therapeutic" courts. 81
In essence, the rehabilitative ideal views offenders as "patients" or "victims,"
who commit crimes because of an "illness" or under the influence of a dysfunc-
tional social environment.1 82 This approach dictates that in order to effectively
reduce crime, it is not enough to deal with the particular offense, since it is merely
a symptom of a larger problem. Rather, it is the duty of the criminal justice sys-
tem to "cure" the offender's "illness."'183 This is to be achieved by penal treatment
intended to "effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted
offenders."' 184 The deeper meaning of this approach, however, is that offenders
are not to be morally blamed for their wrongdoing. They are not responsible for
179. Id. at 123.
180. For a more comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the decline of the rehabilitative approach
to punishment, see FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
181. These courts are the practical application of a relatively new approach to the judiciary and the
law in general better known as "therapeutic jurisprudence." Different types of courts operate under
this title, including Drug Treatment Courts, Juvenile Courts, Domestic Violence Courts, Mental Health
Courts and Reentry Courts. For a general description of these courts and a deeper analysis of therapeu-
tic jurisprudence, see JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
COURTS (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003).
It must be noted that despite the commonalities between the rehabilitative ideal and therapeutic juris-
prudence, they are not merely different titles to the same method. For further analysis of the differ-
ences and similarities of the two approaches, see Philip Bean, Drug Courts, the Judge and the Reha-
bilitative Ideal, in DRUG COURTS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 235 (James L. Nolan Jr. ed., 2002);
William D. McColl, Theory and Practice in the Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court, in DRUG
COURTS: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 3 (James L. Nolan Jr. ed., 2002).
182. BRUNK, supra note 30, at 42.
183. This concept is well illustrated by the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black: "Retri-
bution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241,248 (1949).
184. ALLEN, supra note 180, at 2.
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their criminal act; instead, their sickness is to blame. As was clearly articulated in
the comparison between retributivism and restorative justice, this is fundamentally
different from the way restorative justice views the offender and the goals of the
criminal justice system. As mentioned above, offenders' culpability is one of the
premises of any restorative practice. It is the basis for the offenders' obligations
to repair the harm they caused, which according to restorativists should be the
primary goal of the criminal justice system. Admittedly, in any restorative proc-
ess, offenders must be treated with respect, which means allowing them to explain
the reasons that led them to commit the crime and understanding (as opposed to
accepting) their reasons.' 85 In many cases, these reasons will undoubtedly include
substance abuse or growing up in a destructive environment,' 86 and the terms of
the restitution agreement may well include a section calling for some kind of
commitment on the part of the offender to try and treat his or her underlying prob-
lems. This example of the way restorative justice deals with issues that under a
rehabilitative regime would be considered an "illness," reiterates the basic princi-
ple of offender responsibility. The restorative justice theory does not blame the
drugs for the offense; it blames the drug users. It does not undertake to "cure"
offenders, but demands that they take practical steps to treat their problem as part
of their overall obligation to repair the harm they caused.
The main philosophical premise of the rehabilitative ideal according to which
criminals are sick and need to be "cured" by the state led to a variety of practices
that have become the rehabilitative ideal's most distinct manifestations. Among
these practices were indeterminate sentencing and probation. According to the
former, the actual length of a sentence imposed on a convicted offender was not
determined by the sentencing judge, but by parole boards and judges who super-
vised the inmate's rehabilitation. When they were satisfied the inmate completed
the rehabilitation program, the inmate would be released.
187
While indeterminate sentencing was the vehicle that enabled rehabilitation to
take place, it was the probation officers who were the actual "implementers of the
rehabilitative ideal," 18V treating the individual offenders according to their specific
needs. These distinct manifestations emphasize another fundamental distinction
between the rehabilitative approach to punishment and restorative justice. The
combination of indeterminate sentencing and probation embodies a highly pater-
nalistic approach towards offenders while granting extreme discretion and power
to the assigned state professionals dealing with them. In a dominant rehabilitative
regime, offenders are not asked whether they want their problems treated. Treat-
ment is forced upon them and continues to be until they appear to be "rehabili-
tated"-at which point, the "reformed" offender can finally be released from
185. See Marty Price, Comparing Victim-Offender Mediation Program Models 6 VOMA QUARTERLY
(Summer 1995), available at http://www.vorp.com/articles/compare.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2005)
(comparing two types of victim-offender mediation, and describing their basic elements.)
186. According to recent studies, 67% of all male adult arrestees in 43 U.S. cities and counties in
2003 were drug users and 68.7% of all inmates in the U.S. in 2002 reported using drugs regularly. See
Sourcebook, supra note 26.
187. For a more comprehensive description of the history and development of indeterminate sentenc-
ing, see Marvin Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 45
(1977).
188. Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange
Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933,940 (1995).
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prison. Besides the obvious ineffectiveness of coercing a person to undergo psy-
chological therapy and the vagueness and ambiguity of the rehabilitative tech-
niques, goals, and ways of assessing them, 189 this paternalistic approach has an-
other detrimental effect. Not only does the rehabilitative regime ignore the posi-
tive influence families and communities have on offenders, 190 it diminishes any
influence that may have existed by disempowering these social groups. 19' Re-
storative justice does the exact opposite. First and foremost, it will not force of-
fenders into rehabilitation programs, and it will not define for them the "reasons"
for their wrongdoing. A restorative practice will usually require the offender's
voluntary consent to even begin the process,' 92 let alone undergo a therapeutic
plan. But it also does not overlook the invaluable influential power held by the
offender's close family and community.
As seen above, social influence can play an important role in deterrence and
crime control. 193 At the same time, it can contribute immensely to any rehabilita-
tion efforts that are chosen by offenders and their families and friends. Unlike the
rehabilitative ideal, where these efforts are undertaken by government employees
who must simultaneously deal with dozens if not hundreds of cases, the restora-
tive paradigm channels these efforts to a supportive and effective community
environment. That said, it is not to be inferred that restorative justice is merely a
new and more efficient method of rehabilitation. The point is that the differences
in the way the restorative and the rehabilitative practices are designed, as illus-
trated by the quantity and identity of their participants, as well as their different
goals, indicate the fundamental differences in approach.
I believe the substantial differences between these two approaches to the
criminal justice system and penal sanctioning are sufficient to prevent the miscon-
ception that restorative justice is merely a new form of the failed rehabilitative
ideal, and therefore destined to the same fate. As I have shown above, there are
fundamental differences between the two theories that are exemplified inter alia
by very different practices and objectives. At the same time, there are a few dis-
tinct commonalities that may be the source of confusion. For instance, both the
rehabilitative ideal and the restorative justice theory emphasize the importance of
personalizing the criminal event. Both are concerned with the individuals behind
the story told by the criminal indictment. However, while the rehabilitative ideal
is concerned almost exclusively with the offender, as is the criminal justice sys-
tem, the restorative justice theory concerns itself with victims and their families
just as much as it does with offenders. Another commonality, directly derived
from the personalization aspect of the rehabilitative ideal and restorative justice, is
the holistic approach taken by both theories. As Braithwaite described it, holism
is "a capacity to see the same case as many things at once."' 94 Whereas the tradi-
189. ALLEN, supra note 180, at 51-52.
190. See Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 160.
191. BRArHWArrE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 28, at 95-96 (citing the Maori critique of the
Western justice system as weakening families by "taking away their responsibility for dealing with
crime and preventing recurrence." Braithwaite further cites studies that show the centrality of families
and communities in crime control and rehabilitation).
192. Price, supra note 185.
193. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 160.
194. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 244,
245 (2002) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Therapeutic Jurisprudence].
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tional criminal justice system systematically narrows down the issues and indi-
viduals to be dealt with in each case to a minimum, neither restorative justice nor
the rehabilitative ideal do so. The holistic approach adopted by the rehabilitative
ideal enables it to look beyond the specific criminal act of the offender and to
provide treatment for problems that might seem entirely unrelated to the offense at
hand. In the same way, a holistic approach enables restorative practices to involve
a wider array of participants and to respond to the needs of victims and communi-
ties, as well as the needs of the offender. 195 However, as before, there is a clear
difference between the two theories regarding the attention and status each theory
is willing to grant stakeholders other than the offender. For this reason, as well as
for the other reasons brought forth in this part, restorative justice should not be
affiliated with the once dominant rehabilitative ideal.
D. Restorative justice and equality
One of the primary critiques of restorative justice is that its practical imple-
mentations host a wide variety of results, even in cases that appear to be alike.
This inherent inconsistency in outcome is often viewed as an infringement on the
principle of equality and a contradiction to the criminal justice system's ideal of
uniformity and consistency. 196 According to the retributive theory, a punishment
should be proportionate to only one factor, which is "how blameworthy the actor
is in committing the conduct, not how the victim should be compensated for his or
her injury."' 197 As Andrew von Hirsch asserts, this calls for the standardization of
crime seriousness and culpability, which in return will determine the actual pun-
ishment a convicted offender deserves.' 98 What follows is that the intentional lack
of standardization and predictability, which is inherent in restorative processes
that leave the end result to be decided by the particular participants, necessarily
leads to the infliction of unproportionate, unpredictable-therefore unjustifiable-
sanctions. Similarly, but for a different reason, a strictly utilitarian regime will
value the standardization and predictability of punishment. As mentioned above,
the main mechanism employed by the utilitarian theory of punishment to reduce
crime is deterrence, which is achieved by "some punishment adjustment to the
expected cost of committing a crime above and beyond theprobability of being
caught multiplied by the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains."'199 Accordingly, it is
evident that in the absence of standardized and predictable punishments, it be-
comes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve deterrence, since punish-
ment is part of the "expected cost" of committing a crime. How then can the use
of restorative practices, which oppose standardization and create unpredictable
results, be justified?
There are a few possible ways to resolve this problem. First and foremost, it
must be noted that restorative justice does not advocate for chaos and complete
195. See John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 389, 395 [hereinafter
Braithwaite, Justice and Atonement] (stating that restorative justice is as committed to the victim and
community as much as it is committed to the offender).
196. See supra note 103.
197. Von Hirsch, supra note 130, at 77.
198. Id.
199. Bush, supra note 9, at 464-65.
20051
45
Gabbay: Gabbay: Justifying Restorative Justice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2005
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
unpredictability in the public response to crime. On the contrary, as part of the
criminal justice system, it accepts, and even welcomes, certain restrictions and
supervision over these practices' outcomes. For instance, as Braithwaite argues:
"the law can and should assure [the offenders] that they will never be punished
beyond upper limits. ' '2°  Similarly, the law can and should assure offenders they
are not denied their constitutional rights,20 1 and the criminal justice system can
install control mechanisms to ensure offenders are not subject to degrading or
entirely unacceptable sanctions in restorative processes.2 0 2 By doing so, the crimi-
nal justice system can reduce the otherwise unlimited diversity of outcomes and
contribute to a more foreseeable range of possible results.
Setting upper limits to punishment does not come close to the levels of stan-
dardization and predictability that are thought necessary in the retributive and
utilitarian theories of punishment-that it can hardly be considered as striving
towards equality in punishing equally culpable offenders. In order to respond to
this argument, a reintroduction of the broad understanding of punishment as ap-
plied to restorative practices is useful.20 3 Since according to that definition, re-
storative practices result in punishing offenders, it is not enough to compare one
form of punishment to another and conclude that due to their differences equally
culpable offenders were treated unequally. As Dan Kahan argued elsewhere: "To
indict a particular alternative sanction on grounds of equality, then, requires show-
ing not only that it differs in some way from imprisonment but that the difference
is morally relevant. ' '2°4 Although retributivists may seem to demand that equally
culpable offenders must be treated exactly in the same way, it has been established
previously that this is not an accurate statement. 20 5 Rather, retributivism dictates
that equally culpable offenders should be subject to "sentences that make them
suffer the same amount," 2° 6 even if those sentences are different. This deeper
understanding of equivalent treatment requires us to determine the amount of
punishment according to the aggregated effect of all aspects of the restorative
practice and outcome, and to compare the result with that of a similarly situated
offender. It is on that level that offenders should be treated equally, not merely
according to external and superficial characteristics. 20 7 This approach helps re-
200. Braithwaite, Justice and Atonement, supra note 195, at 395.
201. There are circumstances in which an offender can make an informed and conscious decision to
waive certain rights.
202. See Olson and Dzur, supra note 52, at 166-67 (describing the way criminal justice "profession-
als" guide and supervise the nature of sanctions imposed by Community Reparative Boards (CRBs) in
Vermont).
203. See supra notes I 11- 15.
204. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 102, at 647.
205. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 132.
206. Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 102, at 620.
207. I am aware of the fact that in order to engage in such calculations, it is necessary to determine
the parameters according to which each component of punishment is determined. Although these
determinations require further thought and analysis, which are not in the scope of this work, it is im-
portant to note that such an analysis is not new to the sentencing schemes employed by the current
criminal justice system. Criminal courts these days determine on a daily basis what "mix" of different
types of sanctions amount to a deserved punishment, choosing between (or a combination of) impris-
onment, deferred imprisonment, fines, victim compensation, community service, probation and more.
The specific choice of one or more types of sanctions and their amount is the product of assessing their
specific and general deterrent effect, the amount of condemnation and stigma they express, the burden
and suffering they impose. For a more comprehensive analysis of assessing the particular effect of
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solve the perceived need for equal treatment of offenders in restorative practices
under a utilitarian regime as well. 1°8 Once we have established that restorative
practices do punish offenders, and in a way that will deter them from committing
future crimes as shown above, all that is necessary is that this conviction is con-
veyed to the public. If potential offenders know they will be adequately punished
in a restorative process, then they can include this punishment in their calculation
of the offense's expected "costs," which according to a utilitarian theory gives that
punishment the power to deter.
It should be noted that the notion of equal punishment for equal wrongs be-
came so central to punishment theories due to the criminal justice system's re-
stricted focus on the offender. Once this paradigm is changed, as offered by the
restorative justice theory, this notion becomes only one aspect of the integrity we
demand of our criminal justice system, since we must take into account the equal
treatment of victims and communities as well. The most obvious practical result
of this holistic view is that just as offenders will not be assured the exact equal
treatment in each and every case, victims will not be guaranteed the opportunity to
fulfill any aspiration they may have regarding their case. As Braithwaite suggests:
Restorativists must abandon both equal punishment for offenders and
equal justice (e.g., compensation, empowerment) for victims as goals and
must seek to craft a superior fidelity to the goal of equal concern and re-
spect for all those affected by the crime. The restorative justice circle is
an imperfect vehicle for institutionalizing that aspiration (though for a
wide range of cases, less imperfect than courts of law). But I would ar-
gue that the aspiration is right.
209
I believe this aspiration offers a new perspective to the demand for equal
treatment of equally culpable offenders in the criminal justice system, especially
given the fact that the current justice system is "far from perfect in realizing this
goal' 210 and treats it as an aspiration as well. In the restorative justice paradigm
equality in treatment of offenders is indeed an important aspiration, but one that
must be balanced against other important and at times competing aspirations, such
as attending to victims' needs. Moreover, by lending itself to the particular needs,
interests and wishes of the different participants, the restorative justice paradigm
strives to refrain from a different type of unequal treatment-the equal treatment
of otherwise differently situated offenders, one of the main repercussions of
overly standardized sentencing. When the premise is that people are essentially
different and their particular needs are to be addressed in the public response to
crime, unequal treatment of similarly situated offenders becomes less of a con-
cern.
community service, fines, imprisonment and shaming sanctions, see Kahan, Alternative Sanctions,
supra note 102.
208. According to utilitarianism, which differentiates between the physical offense and the offender,
the tension is not as apparent as in retributivism. In the former, different punishments to different
offenders are perfectly acceptable, if they are the most efficient deterrents, even if the offenders are
equally culpable. See supra note 94, at 125-31.
209. Braithwaite, Justice and Atonement, supra note 195, at 395.
210. Delgado, supra note 103, at 759.
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V. CONCLUSION
What might have happened if R.'s case were dealt with in a restorative prac-
tice instead of being prosecuted? Although we will never know with certainty, I
believe the outcome could have been entirely different. True, R. would have been
required to admit to the factual scheme claimed by the prosecution, but given that
he did not have any personal knowledge to contradict that scheme (he admitted
that he was unable to see since the accident happened rather quickly) and that it
was based mainly on objective expert opinions, this may not have been a real
impediment. Moreover, if the threats of imprisonment and a lengthy criminal trial
were eliminated right at the start, there may have been a further incentive to con-
cede to the facts.
Once R. conceded, this may have been the alternative scenario: After some
preparation, R. and his family and the bereaved family would meet with the assis-
tance of a trained facilitator. At that meeting, they would begin by talking about
the accident. The daughter, who drove the car in front of R., would tell her side of
the story and R. would tell his, but they would not be testifying in court. They
would share the pain, instead of fighting over it. I know R. felt that pain. I saw it
in his eyes. I was his prosecutor.
The two families would then talk about the way the accident impacted their
lives, and the bereaved family would probably receive the much needed apology
from R. They would then discuss ways in which R. can symbolically restore some
of the harm done. Their agreement would likely consist of the same community
service he was sentenced to in court except it would not be in an old age home but
rather would require R. to work with car accident victims. But the agreement
would be able to offer more. R. would have the opportunity to acknowledge the
suffering of the bereaved family by offering to pay some kind of monetary com-
pensation or make a donation to a charitable organization commemorating the
decedent's name. The agreement might have required, for example, that R. talk to
young drivers in his community, telling them his story, teaching them that even an
Air Force pilot cannot afford to lose his concentration even for one second while
driving. The positive impact on those young people could have been great. But
most importantly, it would have taken a few hours instead of two years and would
have had a positive healing and educational impact on both families. The be-
reaved family would have learned that R. was not a monster, but a person who
made a terrible mistake, and must learn to continue living with it. They would
have understood the difference between a "murderer" (the way they referred to
him before and during the trial) and someone who negligently killed another. R.,
in return, would have allowed himself to react naturally to this traumatic incident.
He could have expressed the way he felt and acknowledged his wrongdoing. All
participants would have emerged out of this process feeling they were treated
fairly and that their main concerns were addressed. They would have felt that the
criminal justice system reacted to the accident sensitively, swiftly and appropri-
ately. They would have felt that justice had been served.
I am well aware that for many, especially within the legal community, justice
is a matter of well-defined rules and procedures, and punishment is a matter of
inflicting pain on convicted offenders. As I tried to demonstrate in this article,
justice can be given a deeper meaning, and punishment can be viewed in a broader
respect. I have shown that employing this different understanding does not con-
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tradict the basic principles upon which the current criminal justice system is
based. On the contrary, they promote these principles and deepen their meaning.
To be specific, the inclusion of restorative practices which are based on an entirely
different paradigm of justice, in the criminal justice system, is not without theo-
retical foundation. These processes consist of fundamental principles from both a
retributive and a utilitarian perspective and can therefore go hand in hand with
these theories of punishment, as they guide and influence sentencing policies in
jurisdictions around the world. Through their inclusion, they can help amend
some of the deficiencies our criminal justice system suffers from and advance a
few of the goals this system strives for. But in addition to doing so, restorative
practices can transform the way crime victims and their communities perceive
crime and see offenders. By inducing apologies, understanding and healing, re-
storative practices serve as a vehicle for promoting mutual recognition and offer
its unfortunate participants (who find themselves confronted with the aftermath of
a criminal offense in some way or another) with a meaningful experience they can
relate to naturally and intuitively.
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